Professional cartels and scale fees: chiselling on the celtic fringe?

Economists have been, traditionally, highly critical of many aspects of professional self-regulation. Commentators have identified three principal instruments of self-regulators which work against the public interest: 1. restrictions on entry, 2. restrictions on fee competition, and 3. restrictions...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International review of law and economics 2000-12, Vol.20 (4), p.407-423
Hauptverfasser:	Shinnick, Edward, Stephen, Frank H
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Cartels Demand analysis Deregulation Economic law Empirical research Fees & charges Legal professions Professional fees Self regulation Statistical analysis Statistics Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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