An Experimental Comparison of Two Search Models

We report an experiment designed to investigate markets with consumer search costs. In markets where buyers are matched with one seller at a time, sellers are predicted to sell at prices equal to buyers' valuations. However, we find sellers post prices that offer a more equal division of the su...

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Veröffentlicht in:Economic theory 2000-11, Vol.16 (3), p.735-749
Hauptverfasser: Abrams, Eric, Sefton, Martin, Yavas, Abdullah
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creator Abrams, Eric
Sefton, Martin
Yavas, Abdullah
description We report an experiment designed to investigate markets with consumer search costs. In markets where buyers are matched with one seller at a time, sellers are predicted to sell at prices equal to buyers' valuations. However, we find sellers post prices that offer a more equal division of the surplus, and these prices tend to be accepted, while prices closer to the equilibrium prediction are rejected. At the other extreme, sellers are predicted to sell at a price equal to marginal cost when buyers are matched with two sellers at a time. Here, we find prices are closer to, but still significantly different from, the equilibrium prediction. Thus, our results support theoretical comparative static, but not point, predictions.
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source EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings
subjects Average prices
Cost analysis
Cost efficiency
Economic models
Economic theory
Equilibrium prices
Experimental economics
Forecasts
Histograms
Market prices
Modelling
Monopoly
Pricing
Sellers surplus
Supply and demand
Ultimatum game
title An Experimental Comparison of Two Search Models
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