An Experimental Comparison of Two Search Models
We report an experiment designed to investigate markets with consumer search costs. In markets where buyers are matched with one seller at a time, sellers are predicted to sell at prices equal to buyers' valuations. However, we find sellers post prices that offer a more equal division of the su...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Economic theory 2000-11, Vol.16 (3), p.735-749 |
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creator | Abrams, Eric Sefton, Martin Yavas, Abdullah |
description | We report an experiment designed to investigate markets with consumer search costs. In markets where buyers are matched with one seller at a time, sellers are predicted to sell at prices equal to buyers' valuations. However, we find sellers post prices that offer a more equal division of the surplus, and these prices tend to be accepted, while prices closer to the equilibrium prediction are rejected. At the other extreme, sellers are predicted to sell at a price equal to marginal cost when buyers are matched with two sellers at a time. Here, we find prices are closer to, but still significantly different from, the equilibrium prediction. Thus, our results support theoretical comparative static, but not point, predictions. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1007/PL00020950 |
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subjects | Average prices Cost analysis Cost efficiency Economic models Economic theory Equilibrium prices Experimental economics Forecasts Histograms Market prices Modelling Monopoly Pricing Sellers surplus Supply and demand Ultimatum game |
title | An Experimental Comparison of Two Search Models |
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