ARE NASH BARGAINING WAGE AGREEMENTS UNIQUE? AN INVESTIGATION INTO BARGAINING SETS FOR FIRM-UNION NEGOTIATIONS

The shapes of the bargaining sets for firm-union negotiations are rigorously analyzed in two cases, according to whether bargaining is over wages alone (with employment set according to the labour demand schedule) or over both wages and employment. When bargaining concerns wages only the bargaining...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Oxford economic papers 1996-04, Vol.48 (2), p.242-253
Hauptverfasser:	ALEXANDER, C. O., LEDERMANN, W.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bargaining Bargaining theory of wages Collective bargaining Collective labor agreements Contract negotiations Economic methodology Economic theory Employment Game theory Interpretation and construction Janitors Labor demand Labor demand curve Labor economics Labor unions Mathematical models Pareto efficiency Revenue Studies Utility functions Wage negotiations Wages Wages & salaries Workers' participation
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