Displacing your Principal. Two Historical Case Studies of Some Interest for the Constitutional Future of Europe
The framework of public decisions, and particularly the provision of law, is seen here as an agency contract. What distinguishes this contract is the nature of the right delegated to the agent: The capacity to make law gives the opportunity to take advantage of the incompleteness of the constitution...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | European journal of law and economics 2000-11, Vol.10 (3), p.217-233 |
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| container_title | European journal of law and economics |
| container_volume | 10 |
| creator | Josselin, Jean-Michel Marciano, Alain |
| description | The framework of public decisions, and particularly the provision of law, is seen here as an agency contract. What distinguishes this contract is the nature of the right delegated to the agent: The capacity to make law gives the opportunity to take advantage of the incompleteness of the constitutional contract. The agency relationship may be loosened or even reversed. This article tries to draw some lessons from the English and American history in that matter and applies them to the making of the future European State. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1023/A:1026543414937 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0929-1261 |
| ispartof | European journal of law and economics, 2000-11, Vol.10 (3), p.217-233 |
| issn | 0929-1261 1572-9990 1572-9346 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38979395 |
| source | RePEc; SpringerLink Journals; HeinOnline Law Journal Library |
| subjects | Agency Agency theory Case studies Constitution Constitutional law Contracts Cross-national analysis Decision making Europe European integration European Union History Law Political history Rent-seeking strategic behaviours Studies |
| title | Displacing your Principal. Two Historical Case Studies of Some Interest for the Constitutional Future of Europe |
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