BOARD STRUCTURE, ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS, AND STOCKHOLDER WEALTH
This paper's regression analyses from a sample of 261 firms that adopted 486 antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair-price, reduction in cumulative voting, anti-greenmail and poison pills) in the 1984-88 period indicate that the negative market reactions to antitakeover...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Strategic management journal 1997-03, Vol.18 (3), p.231-245 |
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| creator | SUNDARAMURTHY, CHAMU MAHONEY, JAMES M. MAHONEY, JOSEPH T. |
| description | This paper's regression analyses from a sample of 261 firms that adopted 486 antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair-price, reduction in cumulative voting, anti-greenmail and poison pills) in the 1984-88 period indicate that the negative market reactions to antitakeover provisions vary depending on firms' board structures. This paper's empirical evidence indicates that while separating the positions of CEO and chairperson of the board reduces the negative effect, increased outsider representation increases negative market reactions. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199703)18:3<231::AID-SMJ877>3.0.CO;2-V |
| format | Article |
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Management science ; Power distribution ; Proxy statements ; Shareholder rights plans ; shareholder wealth ; Shareholders ; State court decisions ; Stock prices ; Stockholders ; Strategic management ; Studies ; Take-overs ; Top management</subject><ispartof>Strategic management journal, 1997-03, Vol.18 (3), p.231-245</ispartof><rights>Copyright 1997 John Wiley & Sons Limited</rights><rights>Copyright © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</rights><rights>1997 INIST-CNRS</rights><rights>Copyright Wiley Periodicals Inc. 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Mgmt. J</addtitle><description>This paper's regression analyses from a sample of 261 firms that adopted 486 antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair-price, reduction in cumulative voting, anti-greenmail and poison pills) in the 1984-88 period indicate that the negative market reactions to antitakeover provisions vary depending on firms' board structures. This paper's empirical evidence indicates that while separating the positions of CEO and chairperson of the board reduces the negative effect, increased outsider representation increases negative market reactions.</description><subject>Agency theory</subject><subject>Anti takeover strategy</subject><subject>antitakeover provisions</subject><subject>Applied sciences</subject><subject>board leadership</subject><subject>Boards of directors</subject><subject>Business management</subject><subject>Business organization</subject><subject>Business structures</subject><subject>Chief executive officers</subject><subject>Corporate boards</subject><subject>Corporate governance</subject><subject>Corporate power</subject><subject>Corporate strategies</subject><subject>Correlation analysis</subject><subject>Decision making</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>Fiduciary responsibility</subject><subject>Firm modelling</subject><subject>Impact analysis</subject><subject>Leadership</subject><subject>Managers</subject><subject>Operational research and scientific management</subject><subject>Operational research. Management science</subject><subject>Power distribution</subject><subject>Proxy statements</subject><subject>Shareholder rights plans</subject><subject>shareholder wealth</subject><subject>Shareholders</subject><subject>State court decisions</subject><subject>Stock prices</subject><subject>Stockholders</subject><subject>Strategic management</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Take-overs</subject><subject>Top management</subject><issn>0143-2095</issn><issn>1097-0266</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1997</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>K30</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkV1v0zAYhSMEEmXwD7ioAKFNIsUfdWwXNBHSrA0rDSRpxt0rN3OklKwZcSvYv8dRql7weWXrPY_PeeXjOOcYjTBC5PVpGgXRGUaSu4h43imWkiN6hsWEviUUTyZ-NHXTjx8E5-d0hEZB_Ia4-T1ncHxy3xkgPKYuQZI9dB4Zs0HIXqUcOO_ex34yHaZZsgqyVRK-GvrLLMr8yzDOw2T4KYnzKI3iZdoJHRcHl_N4MbXaVegvsvlj50GpaqOfHM4TZ3URZsHcXcSzKPAXbsEk4S4mSpVkzTy0xqQsNVGYYE_rNZNaaYakFkXhYVZ4xTXzCKJYK-wpO0JUYLv8ifOy971tm297bXZwU5lC17Xa6mZvgAo5RoJyCz77Bdw0-3ZrdwP7W9ZZjuk_IcIQpmSMLfT8bxAWVArOBOvy8p4q2saYVpdw21Y3qr0DjKArEKArELo2oGsD-gKtB9BuJQBbIPQF2gmCIAYCuTV-cYhXplB12aptUZmjO2GcEC4t9qXHvle1vvst_D_Zf4w-TKz10956Y3ZNe7SmSAhMumS3lyuz0z-Osmq_gscpZ3C1nAHlF8sp_ZzBjP4EzAbKSg</recordid><startdate>199703</startdate><enddate>199703</enddate><creator>SUNDARAMURTHY, CHAMU</creator><creator>MAHONEY, JAMES M.</creator><creator>MAHONEY, JOSEPH T.</creator><general>John Wiley & Sons, Ltd</general><general>John Wiley and Sons</general><general>Wiley</general><general>John Wiley</general><general>Wiley Periodicals Inc</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>IQODW</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>HNJIA</scope><scope>IBDFT</scope><scope>K30</scope><scope>PAAUG</scope><scope>PAWHS</scope><scope>PAWZZ</scope><scope>PAXOH</scope><scope>PBHAV</scope><scope>PBQSW</scope><scope>PBYQZ</scope><scope>PCIWU</scope><scope>PCMID</scope><scope>PCZJX</scope><scope>PDGRG</scope><scope>PDWWI</scope><scope>PETMR</scope><scope>PFVGT</scope><scope>PGXDX</scope><scope>PIHIL</scope><scope>PISVA</scope><scope>PJCTQ</scope><scope>PJTMS</scope><scope>PLCHJ</scope><scope>PMHAD</scope><scope>PNQDJ</scope><scope>POUND</scope><scope>PPLAD</scope><scope>PQAPC</scope><scope>PQCAN</scope><scope>PQCMW</scope><scope>PQEME</scope><scope>PQHKH</scope><scope>PQMID</scope><scope>PQNCT</scope><scope>PQNET</scope><scope>PQSCT</scope><scope>PQSET</scope><scope>PSVJG</scope><scope>PVMQY</scope><scope>PZGFC</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0A</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PYYUZ</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>199703</creationdate><title>BOARD STRUCTURE, ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS, AND STOCKHOLDER WEALTH</title><author>SUNDARAMURTHY, CHAMU ; MAHONEY, JAMES M. ; MAHONEY, JOSEPH T.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c5927-12aaf2b560b12ffe2a1216eeb59eae509e8cc615c6cd562031ea16ac610381143</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1997</creationdate><topic>Agency theory</topic><topic>Anti takeover strategy</topic><topic>antitakeover provisions</topic><topic>Applied sciences</topic><topic>board leadership</topic><topic>Boards of directors</topic><topic>Business management</topic><topic>Business organization</topic><topic>Business structures</topic><topic>Chief executive officers</topic><topic>Corporate boards</topic><topic>Corporate governance</topic><topic>Corporate power</topic><topic>Corporate strategies</topic><topic>Correlation analysis</topic><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Exact sciences and technology</topic><topic>Fiduciary responsibility</topic><topic>Firm modelling</topic><topic>Impact analysis</topic><topic>Leadership</topic><topic>Managers</topic><topic>Operational research and scientific management</topic><topic>Operational research. 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| identifier | ISSN: 0143-2095 |
| ispartof | Strategic management journal, 1997-03, Vol.18 (3), p.231-245 |
| issn | 0143-2095 1097-0266 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Periodicals Index Online; Access via Wiley Online Library; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Agency theory Anti takeover strategy antitakeover provisions Applied sciences board leadership Boards of directors Business management Business organization Business structures Chief executive officers Corporate boards Corporate governance Corporate power Corporate strategies Correlation analysis Decision making Exact sciences and technology Fiduciary responsibility Firm modelling Impact analysis Leadership Managers Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Power distribution Proxy statements Shareholder rights plans shareholder wealth Shareholders State court decisions Stock prices Stockholders Strategic management Studies Take-overs Top management |
| title | BOARD STRUCTURE, ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS, AND STOCKHOLDER WEALTH |
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