Strategic Alliances, Shared Facilities, and Entry Deterrence

In this article we explore some possible anticompetitive effects of one particular type of strategic alliance---common in the airline industry, among others--that involves the sharing of production capacity. An offer to share an existing facility can allow an incumbent to persuade a potential entran...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Rand journal of economics 2000-07, Vol.31 (2), p.326-344
Hauptverfasser:	Chen, Zhiqi, Ross, Thomas W.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Airlines Alliances Antitrust Competition Deterrence Economic competition Economic models Economic research Economic theory Economics Effects Fixed costs Incumbents International alliances Marginal cost curve Marginal costs Market entry Market structure Monopoly Production capacity Studies
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