Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms
This paper describes an organizational setting in which professional employees are required to work inefficiently long hours. The focus of our investigation is large law firms. The income sharing that characterizes legal partnerships creates incentives to promote associates who have a propensity to...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The American economic review 1996-06, Vol.86 (3), p.329-348 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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