Strategic Nonlinear Pricing
The objective of this paper is to examine the role of nonlinear strategies in a standard oligopoly framework. We demonstrate that nonlinear pricing may indeed emerge as an equilibrium strategy, but only when firms produce differentiated products, when one firm retains market power due to a cost adva...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) Austria), 2000-01, Vol.71 (2), p.109-131 |
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| container_end_page | 131 |
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| container_title | Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) |
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| creator | Gasmi, Farid Moreaux, Michel Sharkey, William |
| description | The objective of this paper is to examine the role of nonlinear strategies in a standard oligopoly framework. We demonstrate that nonlinear pricing may indeed emerge as an equilibrium strategy, but only when firms produce differentiated products, when one firm retains market power due to a cost advantage, or as part of an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In addition, we examine the role of nonlinear pricing in a spatialcompetition framework. Our main conclusion is that in highly competitive markets, nonlinear pricing strategies are not likely to emerge as an equilibrium. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/BF01227447 |
| format | Article |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online; Jstor Complete Legacy; Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals |
| subjects | Competition Consumer economics Consumer equilibrium Consumer prices Consumer surplus Consumers Duopolies Duopoly Economic competition Economic equilibrium Economic strategies Economic theory Equilibrium Market equilibrium Market power Monopolies Monopoly Nash equilibrium Non-linear models Oligopoly Prices Pricing Pricing strategies Profits Tariffs |
| title | Strategic Nonlinear Pricing |
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