The effects of performance separability and contract type on agent effort

We report the results of an experiment on the influence of performance separability and contract type on the effort levels of subjects working in an environment characterized by team effects. We demonstrate that the principal can achieve improvements in productivity through the choice of incentive s...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Accounting, organizations and society organizations and society, 2000-10, Vol.25 (7), p.683-695
Hauptverfasser:	Rankin, Frederick W, Sayre, Todd L
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Competition Contracts Cooperation Hypotheses Individuals Organizational behavior Performance appraisal Principal-agent theory Productivity Statistical analysis Studies Teamwork
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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