Evolutionary Norm Enforcement

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we c...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of institutional and theoretical economics 2000-06, Vol.156 (2), p.335-347
Hauptverfasser:	Güth, Werner, Ockenfels, Axel
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Contract enforcement Contracts Cooperation Entrepreneurs Evolution Evolutionary economics Game theory Games Legal systems Microeconomics Promises Social evolution Social interaction Trust Verdicts
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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