Rationales of Mortgage Insurance Premium Structures

This study examines the rationales for the design of mortgage insurance premium structures. The actuarially sound premium prices of several widely used structures are formally derived. Two types of cross-subsidization are identified in different structures: (1) subsidization across termination years...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of real estate research 1997-01, Vol.14 (3), p.359-378
Hauptverfasser: Dennis, Barry, Kuo, Chionglong, Yang, Tyler T.
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Kuo, Chionglong
Yang, Tyler T.
description This study examines the rationales for the design of mortgage insurance premium structures. The actuarially sound premium prices of several widely used structures are formally derived. Two types of cross-subsidization are identified in different structures: (1) subsidization across termination years and (2) extra-subsidization of defaulters by non-defaulters. Because these two types of subsidization exist to different degree among the structures, a borrower may self-select into certain structures to maximize (minimize) the benefits (losses) of cross-subsidies. Adverse selection arises when the borrower’s characteristics cannot be completely observed by the insurer. The actuarially sound premium prices should be adjusted for such adverse selection behaviors. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate such adjustments.
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2691-1175
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subjects Adjustable rate mortgages
Adverse selection
ARM
Credit risk
Default
Deferred expenses
Design
Economic behaviour
Economic models
Finance
Insurance
Insurance industry
Insurance premiums
Insurance providers
Loan defaults
Loan payments
Loans
Mortgage companies
Mortgage insurance
Mortgage loans
Mortgages
Net present value
Payments
Prepayments
Present value
Prices
Refinancing
Studies
Subsidies
title Rationales of Mortgage Insurance Premium Structures
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