Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model
The following paper presents a simple neoclassical growth model where corruption is an endogenous result of competition between a public agent and a private agent. The model provides a simple theoretical framework in which the level of corruption as well as the effects of corruption on income, consu...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | European economic review 2000, Vol.44 (1), p.35-60 |
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| container_title | European economic review |
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| creator | Barreto, Raul A. |
| description | The following paper presents a simple neoclassical growth model where corruption is an endogenous result of competition between a public agent and a private agent. The model provides a simple theoretical framework in which the level of corruption as well as the effects of corruption on income, consumption, and growth are identifiable. Bureaucratic red-tape is then added to the model. The results suggest that, a priori, corruption is neither efficiency enhancing nor efficiency detracting with respect to growth but always results in some income redistribution. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00052-X |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | European economic review, 2000, Vol.44 (1), p.35-60 |
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| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Bureaucracy Corruption Economic growth Economic models Economic theory Endogenous Endogenous growth Growth Growth models Income redistribution Mathematical economics Neoclassical economics Studies |
| title | Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model |
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