NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals' Costs
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was designed to reduce tariff rates between Mexico, Canada and the U.S.A. over a period of ten years. However, lower tariff rates are only available to firms that comply with complicated and costly NAFTA filing regulations. Such regulations raise costs...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Review of industrial organization 1999-09, Vol.15 (2), p.103-113 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 113 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 103 |
| container_title | Review of industrial organization |
| container_volume | 15 |
| creator | DEPKEN, CRAIG A. FORD, JON M. |
| description | The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was designed to reduce tariff rates between Mexico, Canada and the U.S.A. over a period of ten years. However, lower tariff rates are only available to firms that comply with complicated and costly NAFTA filing regulations. Such regulations raise costs of small firms relative to large firms in a domestic industry which engages in trade between NAFTA countries. This implication of NAFTA regulations can lead to increased concentration in domestic industries, an hypothesis which can be tested as the transition period comes to an end. Finally, our model suggests an explanation for why the levels of trade from the U.S.A. to Mexico have been lower than general expectations. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1023/A:1007796825076 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38792405</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>41798876</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>41798876</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-j264t-914c4bbe2d44fdc050235bba52dc922f1db4df9993f981f761f4db43834a82303</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpdzktLw0AUBeBBFIzVtSthcKG4iN55z3UXilWhKpQK7sLkMZKQJjWTCv57B-rK1eEePi6HkHMGtwy4uMvuGYAxqC1XYPQBSZgyIjVMwyFJwFpMUdiPY3ISQgsQsZIJuXnNFuuMukAdfaldH-jg6co1oek_6ar5dl24pvMhTOGUHPl41Wd_OSPvi4f1_Cldvj0-z7Nl2nItpxSZLGVR1LyS0lclqLhNFYVTvCqRc8-qQlYeEYVHy7zRzMtYCSuks1yAmJGr_d_tOHzt6jDlmyaUdde5vh52IRfWIJegIrz8B9thN_ZxW84BrWZoZUQXe9SGaRjz7dhs3PiTS2bQWqPFL6-iV3M</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>209861984</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals' Costs</title><source>PAIS Index</source><source>SpringerLink Journals</source><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><creator>DEPKEN, CRAIG A. ; FORD, JON M.</creator><creatorcontrib>DEPKEN, CRAIG A. ; FORD, JON M.</creatorcontrib><description>The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was designed to reduce tariff rates between Mexico, Canada and the U.S.A. over a period of ten years. However, lower tariff rates are only available to firms that comply with complicated and costly NAFTA filing regulations. Such regulations raise costs of small firms relative to large firms in a domestic industry which engages in trade between NAFTA countries. This implication of NAFTA regulations can lead to increased concentration in domestic industries, an hypothesis which can be tested as the transition period comes to an end. Finally, our model suggests an explanation for why the levels of trade from the U.S.A. to Mexico have been lower than general expectations.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0889-938X</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1573-7160</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1023/A:1007796825076</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers</publisher><subject>Competition ; Competitive advantage ; Compliance ; Compliance costs ; Costs ; Economic costs ; Economic models ; Fixed costs ; Free trade ; Game theory ; Hypotheses ; Industrial concentration ; Industrial economics ; Industrial market ; Industrial regulation ; Marginal costs ; NAFTA ; North American Free Trade Agreement ; Regulation ; Size of enterprise ; Small & medium sized enterprises-SME ; Studies ; Tariffs ; Trade ; Trade agreements ; Trade regulations ; Writers</subject><ispartof>Review of industrial organization, 1999-09, Vol.15 (2), p.103-113</ispartof><rights>Copyright (c) 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41798876$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/41798876$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,27866,27924,27925,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>DEPKEN, CRAIG A.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>FORD, JON M.</creatorcontrib><title>NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals' Costs</title><title>Review of industrial organization</title><description>The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was designed to reduce tariff rates between Mexico, Canada and the U.S.A. over a period of ten years. However, lower tariff rates are only available to firms that comply with complicated and costly NAFTA filing regulations. Such regulations raise costs of small firms relative to large firms in a domestic industry which engages in trade between NAFTA countries. This implication of NAFTA regulations can lead to increased concentration in domestic industries, an hypothesis which can be tested as the transition period comes to an end. Finally, our model suggests an explanation for why the levels of trade from the U.S.A. to Mexico have been lower than general expectations.</description><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Competitive advantage</subject><subject>Compliance</subject><subject>Compliance costs</subject><subject>Costs</subject><subject>Economic costs</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Fixed costs</subject><subject>Free trade</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Hypotheses</subject><subject>Industrial concentration</subject><subject>Industrial economics</subject><subject>Industrial market</subject><subject>Industrial regulation</subject><subject>Marginal costs</subject><subject>NAFTA</subject><subject>North American Free Trade Agreement</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>Size of enterprise</subject><subject>Small & medium sized enterprises-SME</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Tariffs</subject><subject>Trade</subject><subject>Trade agreements</subject><subject>Trade regulations</subject><subject>Writers</subject><issn>0889-938X</issn><issn>1573-7160</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1999</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><recordid>eNpdzktLw0AUBeBBFIzVtSthcKG4iN55z3UXilWhKpQK7sLkMZKQJjWTCv57B-rK1eEePi6HkHMGtwy4uMvuGYAxqC1XYPQBSZgyIjVMwyFJwFpMUdiPY3ISQgsQsZIJuXnNFuuMukAdfaldH-jg6co1oek_6ar5dl24pvMhTOGUHPl41Wd_OSPvi4f1_Cldvj0-z7Nl2nItpxSZLGVR1LyS0lclqLhNFYVTvCqRc8-qQlYeEYVHy7zRzMtYCSuks1yAmJGr_d_tOHzt6jDlmyaUdde5vh52IRfWIJegIrz8B9thN_ZxW84BrWZoZUQXe9SGaRjz7dhs3PiTS2bQWqPFL6-iV3M</recordid><startdate>19990901</startdate><enddate>19990901</enddate><creator>DEPKEN, CRAIG A.</creator><creator>FORD, JON M.</creator><general>Kluwer Academic Publishers</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19990901</creationdate><title>NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals' Costs</title><author>DEPKEN, CRAIG A. ; FORD, JON M.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-j264t-914c4bbe2d44fdc050235bba52dc922f1db4df9993f981f761f4db43834a82303</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1999</creationdate><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Competitive advantage</topic><topic>Compliance</topic><topic>Compliance costs</topic><topic>Costs</topic><topic>Economic costs</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Fixed costs</topic><topic>Free trade</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Hypotheses</topic><topic>Industrial concentration</topic><topic>Industrial economics</topic><topic>Industrial market</topic><topic>Industrial regulation</topic><topic>Marginal costs</topic><topic>NAFTA</topic><topic>North American Free Trade Agreement</topic><topic>Regulation</topic><topic>Size of enterprise</topic><topic>Small & medium sized enterprises-SME</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Tariffs</topic><topic>Trade</topic><topic>Trade agreements</topic><topic>Trade regulations</topic><topic>Writers</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>DEPKEN, CRAIG A.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>FORD, JON M.</creatorcontrib><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>Access via ABI/INFORM (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>Politics Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Politics Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Political Science Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Review of industrial organization</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>DEPKEN, CRAIG A.</au><au>FORD, JON M.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals' Costs</atitle><jtitle>Review of industrial organization</jtitle><date>1999-09-01</date><risdate>1999</risdate><volume>15</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>103</spage><epage>113</epage><pages>103-113</pages><issn>0889-938X</issn><eissn>1573-7160</eissn><abstract>The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was designed to reduce tariff rates between Mexico, Canada and the U.S.A. over a period of ten years. However, lower tariff rates are only available to firms that comply with complicated and costly NAFTA filing regulations. Such regulations raise costs of small firms relative to large firms in a domestic industry which engages in trade between NAFTA countries. This implication of NAFTA regulations can lead to increased concentration in domestic industries, an hypothesis which can be tested as the transition period comes to an end. Finally, our model suggests an explanation for why the levels of trade from the U.S.A. to Mexico have been lower than general expectations.</abstract><cop>Boston</cop><pub>Kluwer Academic Publishers</pub><doi>10.1023/A:1007796825076</doi><tpages>11</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0889-938X |
| ispartof | Review of industrial organization, 1999-09, Vol.15 (2), p.103-113 |
| issn | 0889-938X 1573-7160 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38792405 |
| source | PAIS Index; SpringerLink Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Competition Competitive advantage Compliance Compliance costs Costs Economic costs Economic models Fixed costs Free trade Game theory Hypotheses Industrial concentration Industrial economics Industrial market Industrial regulation Marginal costs NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement Regulation Size of enterprise Small & medium sized enterprises-SME Studies Tariffs Trade Trade agreements Trade regulations Writers |
| title | NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals' Costs |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-24T03%3A56%3A02IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=NAFTA%20as%20a%20Means%20of%20Raising%20Rivals'%20Costs&rft.jtitle=Review%20of%20industrial%20organization&rft.au=DEPKEN,%20CRAIG%20A.&rft.date=1999-09-01&rft.volume=15&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=103&rft.epage=113&rft.pages=103-113&rft.issn=0889-938X&rft.eissn=1573-7160&rft_id=info:doi/10.1023/A:1007796825076&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E41798876%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=209861984&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=41798876&rfr_iscdi=true |