Entry and Product Quality Under Price Regulation

Spence (1975, footnote 5, p. 420) has shown that, in equilibrium, a price-regulated monopoly will supply a socially suboptimal level of quality. This tendency to undersupply quality has been used to justify an expansion of regulatory controls to the quality dimension in certain regulated industries...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Review of industrial organization 1995-06, Vol.10 (3), p.361-372
Hauptverfasser:	BEIL, RICHARD O., KASERMAN, DAVID L., FORD, JON M.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Demand curves Industrial market Industrial regulation Insurance regulation Marginal costs Market entry Monopoly Nash equilibrium Oligopolies Price regulation Product quality Social welfare
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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