Share issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends
This study examines how political and economic factors affect the offer price, share allocation, and other terms governments choose when they privatize state-owned enterprises via a public share offering. Using a 59 country sample of 630 share issue privatizations (SIPs) with total proceeds of over...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of financial economics 1999-08, Vol.53 (2), p.217-253 |
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| container_end_page | 253 |
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| container_issue | 2 |
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| container_title | Journal of financial economics |
| container_volume | 53 |
| creator | Jones, Steven L Megginson, William L Nash, Robert C Netter, Jeffry M |
| description | This study examines how political and economic factors affect the offer price, share allocation, and other terms governments choose when they privatize state-owned enterprises via a public share offering. Using a 59 country sample of 630 share issue privatizations (SIPs) with total proceeds of over $446 billion during the period 1977–1997, we find that governments consistently underprice SIP offers, tilt their share allocation patterns to favour domestic investors, impose control restrictions on privatized firms, and typically use fixed-price offers rather than book building or competitive tender offers, all to further political and economic policy objectives. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00021-5 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of financial economics, 1999-08, Vol.53 (2), p.217-253 |
| issn | 0304-405X 1879-2774 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38754109 |
| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete |
| subjects | Economic policy Economic theory Financial economics Going public Investment IPO underpricing Manycountries Pricing Privatization Public ownership Stock prices Studies |
| title | Share issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends |
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