Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies
We study the effect of capital structure decisions on the incentives for firms in a duopoly to share information through a trade association. Focusing on the case of Cournot competition with demand uncertainty, we find that the standard result for all-equity firms that information will not be shared...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | International journal of industrial organization 1999, Vol.17 (1), p.109-135 |
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| container_title | International journal of industrial organization |
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| creator | Dasgupta, Sudipto Shin, Jhinyoung |
| description | We study the effect of capital structure decisions on the incentives for firms in a duopoly to share information through a trade association. Focusing on the case of Cournot competition with demand uncertainty, we find that the standard result for all-equity firms that information will not be shared may be reversed. When one firm has better access to information than the other, leverage may be a way for the latter firm to free-ride on the former firm's information. With ex ante symmetric firms, a trade association will be formed even if information sharing does not occur. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00022-2 |
| format | Article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0167-7187 |
| ispartof | International journal of industrial organization, 1999, Vol.17 (1), p.109-135 |
| issn | 0167-7187 1873-7986 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38675827 |
| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals; Periodicals Index Online |
| subjects | Capital structure Co-operation Duopoly Economic incentives Economic models Free riding Information dissemination Information economics Information exchange Information sharing Oligopoly Studies |
| title | Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies |
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