Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment
We analyse tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When national governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will be willing to o...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of public economics 1999, Vol.71 (1), p.121-139 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 139 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 121 |
| container_title | Journal of public economics |
| container_volume | 71 |
| creator | Haufler, Andreas Wooton, Ian |
| description | We analyse tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When national governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will be willing to offer a subsidy to the firm. At the same time, the firm prefers to locate in the larger market where it will be able to charge a higher producer price. In equilibrium the large country receives the investment and may even be able to charge a positive tax, if the difference in the sizes of the national markets is sufficiently great. The profit tax paid in equilibrium rises further if countries are given an additional instrument of either a tariff or a consumption tax. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00055-3 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38673645</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S0047272798000553</els_id><sourcerecordid>38673645</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c659t-526d38a581b659c0c1ddfb8121959b1e1a7732dc97c7cfe5273fe6acd7c0fafa3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFkEFv1DAQhS1UpC6lP6FSxAHBIdRj13F8AVUraKkq9VB6trzOBFxt7GA7qy6_HmeDeuDSw_PY0nvPo4-QM6CfgEJzfk_phayZZPKDaj9SSoWo-SuyglaqmnFojsjq2XJM3qT0WEzAVbsin9dh8jnuq-T-YGV8V2XzVNkwjJhddsFXfYiz0P30Veci2lw5v8OUB_T5LXndm23C03_zhDx8-_pjfV3f3l19X1_e1rYRKteCNR1vjWhhU96WWui6ftMCAyXUBhCMlJx1VkkrbY-CSd5jY2wnLe1Nb_gJeb_0jjH8nsrnenDJ4nZrPIYpad42kjcXohjf_Wd8DFP0ZTfNKFcA6mASi8nGkFLEXo_RDSbuNVA9I9UHpHrmpVWrD0g1L7mbJRdxRPscQsRx2qANeqe5kVCOfREopcpw87VonCcDXbjrX3koZV-WMizcdg6jTtaht7hA1l1wL6zzF5nmlww</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>203911945</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment</title><source>RePEc</source><source>ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present)</source><creator>Haufler, Andreas ; Wooton, Ian</creator><creatorcontrib>Haufler, Andreas ; Wooton, Ian</creatorcontrib><description>We analyse tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When national governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will be willing to offer a subsidy to the firm. At the same time, the firm prefers to locate in the larger market where it will be able to charge a higher producer price. In equilibrium the large country receives the investment and may even be able to charge a positive tax, if the difference in the sizes of the national markets is sufficiently great. The profit tax paid in equilibrium rises further if countries are given an additional instrument of either a tariff or a consumption tax.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0047-2727</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1879-2316</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00055-3</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JPBEBK</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Country size ; Economic theory ; Equilibrium ; Foreign direct investment ; Foreign investment ; Imports ; Monopolies ; Pricing ; Public economics ; Regional location ; Regionalism ; Studies ; Subsidies ; Tax competition ; Taxation ; Transport costs</subject><ispartof>Journal of public economics, 1999, Vol.71 (1), p.121-139</ispartof><rights>1999 Elsevier Science S.A.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Jan 1999</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c659t-526d38a581b659c0c1ddfb8121959b1e1a7732dc97c7cfe5273fe6acd7c0fafa3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c659t-526d38a581b659c0c1ddfb8121959b1e1a7732dc97c7cfe5273fe6acd7c0fafa3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00055-3$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3548,4006,4022,27921,27922,27923,45993</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeepubeco/v_3a71_3ay_3a1999_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a121-139.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Haufler, Andreas</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wooton, Ian</creatorcontrib><title>Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment</title><title>Journal of public economics</title><description>We analyse tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When national governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will be willing to offer a subsidy to the firm. At the same time, the firm prefers to locate in the larger market where it will be able to charge a higher producer price. In equilibrium the large country receives the investment and may even be able to charge a positive tax, if the difference in the sizes of the national markets is sufficiently great. The profit tax paid in equilibrium rises further if countries are given an additional instrument of either a tariff or a consumption tax.</description><subject>Country size</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Foreign direct investment</subject><subject>Foreign investment</subject><subject>Imports</subject><subject>Monopolies</subject><subject>Pricing</subject><subject>Public economics</subject><subject>Regional location</subject><subject>Regionalism</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Subsidies</subject><subject>Tax competition</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><subject>Transport costs</subject><issn>0047-2727</issn><issn>1879-2316</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1999</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkEFv1DAQhS1UpC6lP6FSxAHBIdRj13F8AVUraKkq9VB6trzOBFxt7GA7qy6_HmeDeuDSw_PY0nvPo4-QM6CfgEJzfk_phayZZPKDaj9SSoWo-SuyglaqmnFojsjq2XJM3qT0WEzAVbsin9dh8jnuq-T-YGV8V2XzVNkwjJhddsFXfYiz0P30Veci2lw5v8OUB_T5LXndm23C03_zhDx8-_pjfV3f3l19X1_e1rYRKteCNR1vjWhhU96WWui6ftMCAyXUBhCMlJx1VkkrbY-CSd5jY2wnLe1Nb_gJeb_0jjH8nsrnenDJ4nZrPIYpad42kjcXohjf_Wd8DFP0ZTfNKFcA6mASi8nGkFLEXo_RDSbuNVA9I9UHpHrmpVWrD0g1L7mbJRdxRPscQsRx2qANeqe5kVCOfREopcpw87VonCcDXbjrX3koZV-WMizcdg6jTtaht7hA1l1wL6zzF5nmlww</recordid><startdate>1999</startdate><enddate>1999</enddate><creator>Haufler, Andreas</creator><creator>Wooton, Ian</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>Elsevier Sequoia S.A</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>1999</creationdate><title>Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment</title><author>Haufler, Andreas ; Wooton, Ian</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c659t-526d38a581b659c0c1ddfb8121959b1e1a7732dc97c7cfe5273fe6acd7c0fafa3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1999</creationdate><topic>Country size</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Foreign direct investment</topic><topic>Foreign investment</topic><topic>Imports</topic><topic>Monopolies</topic><topic>Pricing</topic><topic>Public economics</topic><topic>Regional location</topic><topic>Regionalism</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Subsidies</topic><topic>Tax competition</topic><topic>Taxation</topic><topic>Transport costs</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Haufler, Andreas</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wooton, Ian</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of public economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Haufler, Andreas</au><au>Wooton, Ian</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment</atitle><jtitle>Journal of public economics</jtitle><date>1999</date><risdate>1999</risdate><volume>71</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>121</spage><epage>139</epage><pages>121-139</pages><issn>0047-2727</issn><eissn>1879-2316</eissn><coden>JPBEBK</coden><abstract>We analyse tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When national governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will be willing to offer a subsidy to the firm. At the same time, the firm prefers to locate in the larger market where it will be able to charge a higher producer price. In equilibrium the large country receives the investment and may even be able to charge a positive tax, if the difference in the sizes of the national markets is sufficiently great. The profit tax paid in equilibrium rises further if countries are given an additional instrument of either a tariff or a consumption tax.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00055-3</doi><tpages>19</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0047-2727 |
| ispartof | Journal of public economics, 1999, Vol.71 (1), p.121-139 |
| issn | 0047-2727 1879-2316 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38673645 |
| source | RePEc; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Country size Economic theory Equilibrium Foreign direct investment Foreign investment Imports Monopolies Pricing Public economics Regional location Regionalism Studies Subsidies Tax competition Taxation Transport costs |
| title | Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-10T00%3A37%3A01IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Country%20size%20and%20tax%20competition%20for%20foreign%20direct%20investment&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20public%20economics&rft.au=Haufler,%20Andreas&rft.date=1999&rft.volume=71&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=121&rft.epage=139&rft.pages=121-139&rft.issn=0047-2727&rft.eissn=1879-2316&rft.coden=JPBEBK&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00055-3&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E38673645%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=203911945&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S0047272798000553&rfr_iscdi=true |