Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint

The government's incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the trade-off between political benefits and economic costs, the latter depending on the decentralization of government. Two effects of federalism are derived: First, fiscal competition among local governments under...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The American economic review 1998-12, Vol.88 (5), p.1143-1162
Hauptverfasser:	Qian, Yingyi, Roland, Gérard
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bailouts Budget constraint Budget constraints Budgets Capital flight Capital investments Centralization Competition Competitiveness Costs Decentralization Economic competition Economic models Economic theory Expenditures Externality Federal budget Federal government Federalism Fiscal policy Government Government budgets Incentives Infrastructure investments Local government Macroeconomics Market economies Monetary policy Opportunity costs Privatization Public goods Studies Subsidies Trade-off Transition economies
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