Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists

We show that there exists a time-independent tax rule that guides polluting oligopolists to achieve the socially optimum production path. The optimal tax is dependent on the current pollution stock, and it may be negative when the pollution stock is low. A surprising result is that the optimal tax r...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of public economics 1998-11, Vol.70 (2), p.325-342
Hauptverfasser:	Benchekroun, Hassan, van Long, Ngo
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Dynamic games Economic incentives Economic models Efficiency Environmental tax Incentive Oligopoly Pollution Public economics Statistical analysis Studies Subsidies Taxation
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!