The acid rain differential game
This paper considers an acid rain differential game. Countries emit sulphur which is partly transferred to other countries. Depositions above critical loads ultimately destroy the soil. Countries face a trade-off between the costs of emission reductions and the damage to the soil due to the depletio...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Environmental & resource economics 1998-09, Vol.12 (2), p.167-184 |
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| container_title | Environmental & resource economics |
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| creator | Maeler, K.G. (Tilburg Univ. (Netherlands). Beijer International Inst. of Ecological Economics) Zeeuw, A. de |
| description | This paper considers an acid rain differential game. Countries emit sulphur which is partly transferred to other countries. Depositions above critical loads ultimately destroy the soil. Countries face a trade-off between the costs of emission reductions and the damage to the soil due to the depletion of the acid buffers. Because of the transboundary externalities the outcome will depend on whether the countries cooperate or not. This paper presents the cooperative outcome and the open-loop and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria of the acid rain differential game. It will be shown that the depositions always converge to the critical loads but the steady-state levels of the buffer stocks differ. The theory is used to analyse the acid rain differential game for sulphur between Great Britain and Ireland. Finally, some results are given for the whole of Europe. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998 |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1023/A:1008273509255 |
| format | Article |
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(Tilburg Univ. (Netherlands). Beijer International Inst. of Ecological Economics) ; Zeeuw, A. de</creator><creatorcontrib>Maeler, K.G. (Tilburg Univ. (Netherlands). Beijer International Inst. of Ecological Economics) ; Zeeuw, A. de</creatorcontrib><description>This paper considers an acid rain differential game. Countries emit sulphur which is partly transferred to other countries. Depositions above critical loads ultimately destroy the soil. Countries face a trade-off between the costs of emission reductions and the damage to the soil due to the depletion of the acid buffers. Because of the transboundary externalities the outcome will depend on whether the countries cooperate or not. This paper presents the cooperative outcome and the open-loop and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria of the acid rain differential game. It will be shown that the depositions always converge to the critical loads but the steady-state levels of the buffer stocks differ. The theory is used to analyse the acid rain differential game for sulphur between Great Britain and Ireland. Finally, some results are given for the whole of Europe. 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Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998</description><subject>ACID DEPOSITION</subject><subject>Acid rain</subject><subject>Acids</subject><subject>Buffer stocks</subject><subject>Buffers</subject><subject>critical loads</subject><subject>Depletion</subject><subject>Differential games</subject><subject>Emissions</subject><subject>Emissions control</subject><subject>Environmental economics</subject><subject>ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES</subject><subject>Externality</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>GREAT BRITAIN</subject><subject>International cooperation</subject><subject>IRELAND</subject><subject>POLLUTANT LOAD</subject><subject>POLLUTION</subject><subject>Pollution control</subject><subject>Pollution levels</subject><subject>Rain</subject><subject>Soil erosion</subject><subject>SOIL POLLUTION</subject><subject>Soils</subject><subject>Sulfur</subject><subject>SULPHUR</subject><subject>United Kingdom</subject><issn>0924-6460</issn><issn>1573-1502</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1998</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><recordid>eNqFj8tLw0AQxhdRsFbPnsSA4C06s8-sNyk-KXqp52W72bSpeblJhf73bqgnLx5mvuHjNx8zhJwj3CBQdnt_hwAZVUyApkIckAkKxVIUQA_JJHo8lVzCMTnp-w0AaMXlhFwu1j6xrsyTYMsmycui8ME3Q2mrZGVrf0qOClv1_uxXp-Tj8WExe07n708vs_t56jiHIfUZY-CcdZrnUjsq0Ys8o0hzL9WSIyDaeIKGQlLObCGX4HLFUOVAdYGCTcn1PrcL7dfW94Opy975qrKNb7e9YZlEhYz_C44UaA4RvPoDbtptaOIThjIlQTPGdaRe91TwnXemC2Vtw8582s43wUfn2zCLNLbdOGidRSljjVY3WlIZzLhZD3UMu9iHFbY1dhXK3rzNxx0AKQWyH9h0ecs</recordid><startdate>19980901</startdate><enddate>19980901</enddate><creator>Maeler, K.G. 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| ispartof | Environmental & resource economics, 1998-09, Vol.12 (2), p.167-184 |
| issn | 0924-6460 1573-1502 |
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| source | RePEc; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | ACID DEPOSITION Acid rain Acids Buffer stocks Buffers critical loads Depletion Differential games Emissions Emissions control Environmental economics ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES Externality Game theory GREAT BRITAIN International cooperation IRELAND POLLUTANT LOAD POLLUTION Pollution control Pollution levels Rain Soil erosion SOIL POLLUTION Soils Sulfur SULPHUR United Kingdom |
| title | The acid rain differential game |
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