Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining

We report decision making in two-person extensive form game trees, using six treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to examine game theoretic hypotheses of decision making based on dominance and backward induction in comparison with the culturally o...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 1998-07, Vol.24 (1-2), p.10-24
Hauptverfasser:	McCabe, Kevin A, Rassenti, Stephen J, Smith, Vernon L
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Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Access to information Asymmetric information Co-operation Decision making Equilibrium Game theory Games of strategy Reciprocity Self-interest
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container_end_page	24
container_issue	1-2
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container_title	Games and economic behavior
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creator	McCabe, Kevin A Rassenti, Stephen J Smith, Vernon L
description	We report decision making in two-person extensive form game trees, using six treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to examine game theoretic hypotheses of decision making based on dominance and backward induction in comparison with the culturally or biologically derived hypothesis that reciprocity supports more cooperation than predicted by game theory. We find strong support for cooperation under complete information, even in single-play treatments and in games of trust, unreinforced by the prospect of punishment for defection from reciprocity. Only under private information do we observe strong support for noncooperative game theory.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C78, C92.
doi_str_mv	10.1006/game.1998.0638
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subjects	Access to information Asymmetric information Co-operation Decision making Equilibrium Game theory Games of strategy Reciprocity Self-interest
title	Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining
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