The IMF and Russia

If one ignores exotic rhetoric and remains in a professional framework, it is possible to identify 2 main lines of criticism of the International Monetary Fund's response to the situation in Russia: 1. IMF lost time when it was possible and necessary to energetically support reforms and thus co...

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Veröffentlicht in:The American economic review 1997-05, Vol.87 (2), p.13-16
1. Verfasser: Gaidar, Yegor
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description If one ignores exotic rhetoric and remains in a professional framework, it is possible to identify 2 main lines of criticism of the International Monetary Fund's response to the situation in Russia: 1. IMF lost time when it was possible and necessary to energetically support reforms and thus condemned Russia to prolonged crisis and stagnation. 2. In the postsocialist era, due to a special structure of the economy, inflation has a nonmonetary character, which is why ordinary stabilization programs directed at slowing down the rates of money growth are not applicable in those conditions. Excessive tightness and dogmatism of IMF programs condemn them to failure. Complaints about the dogmatism of IMF programs continue. The truth of these claims for the biggest post-socialist economy - the Russian one - are considered.
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subjects Agricultural subsidies
Applied Economics in Action: The International Monetary Fund
Central banks
Coups d'etat
Currency
Development banks
Dogmatism
Economic aid
Economic conditions
Economic development
Economic growth rate
Economic policy
Economic reform
Economic relations
Governmental reform
Hard currency
Hyperinflation
IMF
Inflation
Inflation rates
International financial institutions
Monetary policy
Politics
Russia
Socialism
Studies
Subsidies
Success
title The IMF and Russia
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