Moral Hazard in Property Tax Administration: A Comparative Analysis of the Czech and Slovak Republics
Fiscal decentralisation in the Czech and Slovak Republics has only begun to establish local autonomy. In Slovakia, unusual politics have resulted in sparse revenue transfers but somewhat greater fiscal independence for municipalities through the property tax. The Czech Republic, more generous to its...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Comparative economic studies 2003-03, Vol.45 (1), p.44-62 |
---|---|
Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 62 |
---|---|
container_issue | 1 |
container_start_page | 44 |
container_title | Comparative economic studies |
container_volume | 45 |
creator | Bryson, Phillip J Cornia, Gary C |
description | Fiscal decentralisation in the Czech and Slovak Republics has only begun to establish local autonomy. In Slovakia, unusual politics have resulted in sparse revenue transfers but somewhat greater fiscal independence for municipalities through the property tax. The Czech Republic, more generous to its municipalities, has not let local governments develop autonomously. The property tax, the best vehicle for generating independent funds, remains largely symbolic, as under central planning. The tax's moral hazard problems become apparent in comparing Czech and Slovak local budgets. As a result of greater fiscal need, Slovak municipalities have demonstrated what can be achieved through greater property tax collection effort. Comparative Economic Studies (2003) 45, 44–62. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces. 8100003 |
doi_str_mv | 10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100003 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>gale_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38522908</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><galeid>A100737289</galeid><sourcerecordid>A100737289</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c482m-4e653cb4987c08687412d0c916adcbb702c7fed0e7f96d4d84c64ab5dcabfec73</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNklFv0zAUhSMEEmXwD0CyeEDiIcVxnNjhLaqAVmxigiEeLce5aT2SOLOTat2v51bZJjHtYbaurdjfOVauThS9TegyoZn4NOh26_UelgbCUiYUR_osWiRcyDhNGX0eLaiUMhYsTV9Gr0K4RIJRJhYRnDmvW7LWN9rXxPbk3LsB_HggF_qalHVnextGr0fr-s-kJCvXDfr4uQdS9ro9BBuIa8i4A7K6AbMjuq_Jr9bt9V_yE4apaq0Jr6MXjW4DvLndT6LfX79crNbx6Y9vm1V5GhsuWRdzyLPUVLyQwlCZS8ETVlNTJLmuTVUJyoxooKYgmiKveS25ybmustroqgEj0pPow-w7eHc1QRhVZ4OBttU9uCmoVGaMFVQi-P4BeOkmj_8TFKNJLouEZwjFM7TVLSjbNw4bYbbQA7bM9dBYPC6x3SIVTBbILx_hcdbQWfOo4ON_AmRGuB63egpBfT_fPJndnP15Ort-4Mtn1ngXgodGDd522h9UQtUxXeouXQrTpW7ThbL1LPMwgLnXIGswIQjuVap5hssBi6EEN4uVYA3HO65ypnZjh1bvZqtej5OHe6-7p_4BM9flgg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>201689145</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Moral Hazard in Property Tax Administration: A Comparative Analysis of the Czech and Slovak Republics</title><source>RePEc</source><source>Springer Online Journals Complete</source><source>Business Source Complete</source><creator>Bryson, Phillip J ; Cornia, Gary C</creator><creatorcontrib>Bryson, Phillip J ; Cornia, Gary C</creatorcontrib><description>Fiscal decentralisation in the Czech and Slovak Republics has only begun to establish local autonomy. In Slovakia, unusual politics have resulted in sparse revenue transfers but somewhat greater fiscal independence for municipalities through the property tax. The Czech Republic, more generous to its municipalities, has not let local governments develop autonomously. The property tax, the best vehicle for generating independent funds, remains largely symbolic, as under central planning. The tax's moral hazard problems become apparent in comparing Czech and Slovak local budgets. As a result of greater fiscal need, Slovak municipalities have demonstrated what can be achieved through greater property tax collection effort. Comparative Economic Studies (2003) 45, 44–62. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces. 8100003</description><identifier>ISSN: 0888-7233</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1478-3320</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100003</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New Brunswick: Palgrave Macmillan</publisher><subject>Autonomy ; Budgets ; Comparative analysis ; Czech Republic ; Decentralization ; Economic indicators ; Economics ; Ethical aspects ; Fiscal policy ; Funding ; Government ; Laws, regulations and rules ; Moral hazard ; Politics ; Privatization ; Property tax ; Property taxes ; Public services ; Slovakia ; State court decisions ; Tax policy ; Tax rates ; Tax revenues ; Taxation ; Transition economies</subject><ispartof>Comparative economic studies, 2003-03, Vol.45 (1), p.44-62</ispartof><rights>COPYRIGHT 2003 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. (Springer)</rights><rights>Copyright (c) 2003 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c482m-4e653cb4987c08687412d0c916adcbb702c7fed0e7f96d4d84c64ab5dcabfec73</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c482m-4e653cb4987c08687412d0c916adcbb702c7fed0e7f96d4d84c64ab5dcabfec73</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>315,781,785,4009,27929,27930</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/palcompes/v_3a45_3ay_3a2003_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a44-62.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Bryson, Phillip J</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cornia, Gary C</creatorcontrib><title>Moral Hazard in Property Tax Administration: A Comparative Analysis of the Czech and Slovak Republics</title><title>Comparative economic studies</title><description>Fiscal decentralisation in the Czech and Slovak Republics has only begun to establish local autonomy. In Slovakia, unusual politics have resulted in sparse revenue transfers but somewhat greater fiscal independence for municipalities through the property tax. The Czech Republic, more generous to its municipalities, has not let local governments develop autonomously. The property tax, the best vehicle for generating independent funds, remains largely symbolic, as under central planning. The tax's moral hazard problems become apparent in comparing Czech and Slovak local budgets. As a result of greater fiscal need, Slovak municipalities have demonstrated what can be achieved through greater property tax collection effort. Comparative Economic Studies (2003) 45, 44–62. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces. 8100003</description><subject>Autonomy</subject><subject>Budgets</subject><subject>Comparative analysis</subject><subject>Czech Republic</subject><subject>Decentralization</subject><subject>Economic indicators</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Ethical aspects</subject><subject>Fiscal policy</subject><subject>Funding</subject><subject>Government</subject><subject>Laws, regulations and rules</subject><subject>Moral hazard</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Privatization</subject><subject>Property tax</subject><subject>Property taxes</subject><subject>Public services</subject><subject>Slovakia</subject><subject>State court decisions</subject><subject>Tax policy</subject><subject>Tax rates</subject><subject>Tax revenues</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><subject>Transition economies</subject><issn>0888-7233</issn><issn>1478-3320</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2003</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><sourceid>KPI</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNqNklFv0zAUhSMEEmXwD0CyeEDiIcVxnNjhLaqAVmxigiEeLce5aT2SOLOTat2v51bZJjHtYbaurdjfOVauThS9TegyoZn4NOh26_UelgbCUiYUR_osWiRcyDhNGX0eLaiUMhYsTV9Gr0K4RIJRJhYRnDmvW7LWN9rXxPbk3LsB_HggF_qalHVnextGr0fr-s-kJCvXDfr4uQdS9ro9BBuIa8i4A7K6AbMjuq_Jr9bt9V_yE4apaq0Jr6MXjW4DvLndT6LfX79crNbx6Y9vm1V5GhsuWRdzyLPUVLyQwlCZS8ETVlNTJLmuTVUJyoxooKYgmiKveS25ybmustroqgEj0pPow-w7eHc1QRhVZ4OBttU9uCmoVGaMFVQi-P4BeOkmj_8TFKNJLouEZwjFM7TVLSjbNw4bYbbQA7bM9dBYPC6x3SIVTBbILx_hcdbQWfOo4ON_AmRGuB63egpBfT_fPJndnP15Ort-4Mtn1ngXgodGDd522h9UQtUxXeouXQrTpW7ThbL1LPMwgLnXIGswIQjuVap5hssBi6EEN4uVYA3HO65ypnZjh1bvZqtej5OHe6-7p_4BM9flgg</recordid><startdate>20030301</startdate><enddate>20030301</enddate><creator>Bryson, Phillip J</creator><creator>Cornia, Gary C</creator><general>Palgrave Macmillan</general><general>Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. (Springer)</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>IHI</scope><scope>IMW</scope><scope>KPI</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20030301</creationdate><title>Moral Hazard in Property Tax Administration: A Comparative Analysis of the Czech and Slovak Republics</title><author>Bryson, Phillip J ; Cornia, Gary C</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c482m-4e653cb4987c08687412d0c916adcbb702c7fed0e7f96d4d84c64ab5dcabfec73</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2003</creationdate><topic>Autonomy</topic><topic>Budgets</topic><topic>Comparative analysis</topic><topic>Czech Republic</topic><topic>Decentralization</topic><topic>Economic indicators</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Ethical aspects</topic><topic>Fiscal policy</topic><topic>Funding</topic><topic>Government</topic><topic>Laws, regulations and rules</topic><topic>Moral hazard</topic><topic>Politics</topic><topic>Privatization</topic><topic>Property tax</topic><topic>Property taxes</topic><topic>Public services</topic><topic>Slovakia</topic><topic>State court decisions</topic><topic>Tax policy</topic><topic>Tax rates</topic><topic>Tax revenues</topic><topic>Taxation</topic><topic>Transition economies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Bryson, Phillip J</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cornia, Gary C</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Gale In Context: U.S. History</collection><collection>Gale In Context: World History</collection><collection>Gale In Context: Global Issues</collection><collection>Global News & ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Comparative economic studies</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Bryson, Phillip J</au><au>Cornia, Gary C</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Moral Hazard in Property Tax Administration: A Comparative Analysis of the Czech and Slovak Republics</atitle><jtitle>Comparative economic studies</jtitle><date>2003-03-01</date><risdate>2003</risdate><volume>45</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>44</spage><epage>62</epage><pages>44-62</pages><issn>0888-7233</issn><eissn>1478-3320</eissn><abstract>Fiscal decentralisation in the Czech and Slovak Republics has only begun to establish local autonomy. In Slovakia, unusual politics have resulted in sparse revenue transfers but somewhat greater fiscal independence for municipalities through the property tax. The Czech Republic, more generous to its municipalities, has not let local governments develop autonomously. The property tax, the best vehicle for generating independent funds, remains largely symbolic, as under central planning. The tax's moral hazard problems become apparent in comparing Czech and Slovak local budgets. As a result of greater fiscal need, Slovak municipalities have demonstrated what can be achieved through greater property tax collection effort. Comparative Economic Studies (2003) 45, 44–62. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces. 8100003</abstract><cop>New Brunswick</cop><pub>Palgrave Macmillan</pub><doi>10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100003</doi><tpages>19</tpages></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 0888-7233 |
ispartof | Comparative economic studies, 2003-03, Vol.45 (1), p.44-62 |
issn | 0888-7233 1478-3320 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38522908 |
source | RePEc; Springer Online Journals Complete; Business Source Complete |
subjects | Autonomy Budgets Comparative analysis Czech Republic Decentralization Economic indicators Economics Ethical aspects Fiscal policy Funding Government Laws, regulations and rules Moral hazard Politics Privatization Property tax Property taxes Public services Slovakia State court decisions Tax policy Tax rates Tax revenues Taxation Transition economies |
title | Moral Hazard in Property Tax Administration: A Comparative Analysis of the Czech and Slovak Republics |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-15T15%3A36%3A39IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-gale_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Moral%20Hazard%20in%20Property%20Tax%20Administration:%20A%20Comparative%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Czech%20and%20Slovak%20Republics&rft.jtitle=Comparative%20economic%20studies&rft.au=Bryson,%20Phillip%20J&rft.date=2003-03-01&rft.volume=45&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=44&rft.epage=62&rft.pages=44-62&rft.issn=0888-7233&rft.eissn=1478-3320&rft_id=info:doi/10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100003&rft_dat=%3Cgale_proqu%3EA100737289%3C/gale_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=201689145&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_galeid=A100737289&rfr_iscdi=true |