The effects of asymmetry among advisors on the aggregation of their opinions
We investigate the case of a Decision Maker (DM) who obtains probabilistic forecasts regarding the occurrence of a target event from J distinct, asymmetric advisors. In this context, asymmetry is induced by manipulating: (1) amount of information (number of diagnostic cues) available to each advisor...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Organizational behavior and human decision processes 2003, Vol.90 (1), p.178-194 |
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| container_title | Organizational behavior and human decision processes |
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| creator | Budescu, David V Rantilla, Adrian K Yu, Hsiu-Ting Karelitz, Tzur M |
| description | We investigate the case of a Decision Maker (DM) who obtains probabilistic forecasts regarding the occurrence of a target event from
J distinct, asymmetric advisors. In this context, asymmetry is induced by manipulating: (1) amount of information (number of diagnostic cues) available to each advisor and (2) quality (accuracy) of advisors’ previous forecasts. Empirical results from two experiments indicate that the DM’s final estimate can be described as a weighted average of advisor forecasts, where the weights are sensitive to both sources of asymmetry. This work extends the model derived by
Budescu and Rantilla (2000) for the DMs confidence in the aggregate to accommodate advisor asymmetry. As in the symmetric case, the DM’s confidence in the weighted average of the forecasts is a function of the number of judges, the total number of cues, the (inferred) inter-judge correlation, and the level of inter-judge overlap in information. The extended model predicts that confidence increases as a function of asymmetry among judges. Empirical results support the main (ordinal) predictions of the model, including the predicted effect of inter-judge asymmetry. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/S0749-5978(02)00516-2 |
| format | Article |
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Budescu and Rantilla (2000) for the DMs confidence in the aggregate to accommodate advisor asymmetry. As in the symmetric case, the DM’s confidence in the weighted average of the forecasts is a function of the number of judges, the total number of cues, the (inferred) inter-judge correlation, and the level of inter-judge overlap in information. The extended model predicts that confidence increases as a function of asymmetry among judges. Empirical results support the main (ordinal) predictions of the model, including the predicted effect of inter-judge asymmetry.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0749-5978</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1095-9920</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/S0749-5978(02)00516-2</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Accuracy ; Advisors ; Applied psychology ; Asymmetric information ; Asymmetry ; Biological and medical sciences ; Cognition ; Cognition. Intelligence ; Decision making ; Decision making. Choice ; Decision theory ; Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology ; Human behaviour ; Information ; Mathematical models ; Organization theory ; Probability ; Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry ; Psychology. Psychophysiology ; Social psychology ; Studies</subject><ispartof>Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 2003, Vol.90 (1), p.178-194</ispartof><rights>2003 Elsevier Science (USA)</rights><rights>2003 INIST-CNRS</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc. Jan 2003</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c514t-e089b1e8322dc3b39035e5c2220cb0929a3d00cd87d733968d6262c1be7866593</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c514t-e089b1e8322dc3b39035e5c2220cb0929a3d00cd87d733968d6262c1be7866593</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0749-5978(02)00516-2$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3550,4008,4024,27923,27924,27925,30999,45995</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=14750987$$DView record in Pascal Francis$$Hfree_for_read</backlink><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejobhdp/v_3a90_3ay_3a2003_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a178-194.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Budescu, David V</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Rantilla, Adrian K</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yu, Hsiu-Ting</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Karelitz, Tzur M</creatorcontrib><title>The effects of asymmetry among advisors on the aggregation of their opinions</title><title>Organizational behavior and human decision processes</title><description>We investigate the case of a Decision Maker (DM) who obtains probabilistic forecasts regarding the occurrence of a target event from
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J distinct, asymmetric advisors. In this context, asymmetry is induced by manipulating: (1) amount of information (number of diagnostic cues) available to each advisor and (2) quality (accuracy) of advisors’ previous forecasts. Empirical results from two experiments indicate that the DM’s final estimate can be described as a weighted average of advisor forecasts, where the weights are sensitive to both sources of asymmetry. This work extends the model derived by
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| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete; Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA) |
| subjects | Accuracy Advisors Applied psychology Asymmetric information Asymmetry Biological and medical sciences Cognition Cognition. Intelligence Decision making Decision making. Choice Decision theory Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology Human behaviour Information Mathematical models Organization theory Probability Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry Psychology. Psychophysiology Social psychology Studies |
| title | The effects of asymmetry among advisors on the aggregation of their opinions |
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