A test of the signalling hypothesis

Education may enhance earnings either because of human capital increases or by signalling unobservable worker attributes. Previous tests of these alternatives relied on ad hoc distinctions between them. Our theoretical model provides a direct signal measure as the difference between required and nec...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Oxford economic papers 2003-04, Vol.55 (2), p.191-215
Hauptverfasser:	Chatterji, Monojit, Seaman, Paul T., Singell Jr, Larry D.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Coefficients Earnings Economic models Economic theory Economics Education Educational attainment Employee qualifications Employees Employers Human capital Human resources Hypotheses Labour economics Mathematical models Men Modeling Monitoring costs Outcomes of education Overqualification Productivity Qualifications Signalling Skilled workers Wages Wages & salaries Workers
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