A test of the signalling hypothesis
Education may enhance earnings either because of human capital increases or by signalling unobservable worker attributes. Previous tests of these alternatives relied on ad hoc distinctions between them. Our theoretical model provides a direct signal measure as the difference between required and nec...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Oxford economic papers 2003-04, Vol.55 (2), p.191-215 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 215 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 191 |
| container_title | Oxford economic papers |
| container_volume | 55 |
| creator | Chatterji, Monojit Seaman, Paul T. Singell Jr, Larry D. |
| description | Education may enhance earnings either because of human capital increases or by signalling unobservable worker attributes. Previous tests of these alternatives relied on ad hoc distinctions between them. Our theoretical model provides a direct signal measure as the difference between required and necessary qualifications, forming the basis for an ordered‐probit model of discrete differences between required and necessary qualifications that depend on firm, job, and worker attributes. Estimates support the model's predictions, providing a continuous, predicted signal measure for second‐stage earnings equations. These results provide the first formal evidence of a significant, positive, gender‐specific return to a signal and indicate a downward bias in the return to education from excluding the signal measure. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/oep/55.2.191 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38435801</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>3488890</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>3488890</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c412t-1bf0cd33d98b6a8465e5ae89855f46d12374cc5152ee26f3028483aa53a655363</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpdkM1LAzEUxIMoWKs3jx4WBU9um-TlZZNjqdoKxQ9QEC8h3WbbrdtmTbZg_3u3VDx4evDmN8MwhJwz2mNUQ9-7uo_Y4z2m2QHpMCFFCorxQ9KhFGiaSYRjchLjklIqKGYdcjVIGhebxBdJs3BJLOdrW1Xlep4strVvX7GMp-SosFV0Z7-3S97u716H43TyNHoYDiZpLhhvUjYtaD4DmGk1lVYJiQ6tU1ohFkLOGIdM5Dky5M5xWQDlSiiwFsFKRJDQJdf73Dr4r03byqzKmLuqsmvnN9GAEoCKsha8_Acu_Sa0xaNhWismgWUtdLOH8uBjDK4wdShXNmwNo2Y3l2nnMoiGt6Zd5sUeX8bGhz8WhFJK01ZO93IZG_f9J9vwaWQGGZrx-4d5zoDdjl60eYQfA5FzOw</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>199816317</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>A test of the signalling hypothesis</title><source>Oxford journals</source><source>JSTOR</source><creator>Chatterji, Monojit ; Seaman, Paul T. ; Singell Jr, Larry D.</creator><creatorcontrib>Chatterji, Monojit ; Seaman, Paul T. ; Singell Jr, Larry D.</creatorcontrib><description>Education may enhance earnings either because of human capital increases or by signalling unobservable worker attributes. Previous tests of these alternatives relied on ad hoc distinctions between them. Our theoretical model provides a direct signal measure as the difference between required and necessary qualifications, forming the basis for an ordered‐probit model of discrete differences between required and necessary qualifications that depend on firm, job, and worker attributes. Estimates support the model's predictions, providing a continuous, predicted signal measure for second‐stage earnings equations. These results provide the first formal evidence of a significant, positive, gender‐specific return to a signal and indicate a downward bias in the return to education from excluding the signal measure.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0030-7653</identifier><identifier>ISSN: 1464-3812</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1464-3812</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/oep/55.2.191</identifier><identifier>CODEN: OXEPA8</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Coefficients ; Earnings ; Economic models ; Economic theory ; Economics ; Education ; Educational attainment ; Employee qualifications ; Employees ; Employers ; Human capital ; Human resources ; Hypotheses ; Labour economics ; Mathematical models ; Men ; Modeling ; Monitoring costs ; Outcomes of education ; Overqualification ; Productivity ; Qualifications ; Signalling ; Skilled workers ; Wages ; Wages & salaries ; Workers</subject><ispartof>Oxford economic papers, 2003-04, Vol.55 (2), p.191-215</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2003 Oxford University Press</rights><rights>Copyright Oxford University Press(England) Apr 2003</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c412t-1bf0cd33d98b6a8465e5ae89855f46d12374cc5152ee26f3028483aa53a655363</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3488890$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/3488890$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,27901,27902,57992,58225</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Chatterji, Monojit</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Seaman, Paul T.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Singell Jr, Larry D.</creatorcontrib><title>A test of the signalling hypothesis</title><title>Oxford economic papers</title><addtitle>Oxf. Econ. Pap</addtitle><description>Education may enhance earnings either because of human capital increases or by signalling unobservable worker attributes. Previous tests of these alternatives relied on ad hoc distinctions between them. Our theoretical model provides a direct signal measure as the difference between required and necessary qualifications, forming the basis for an ordered‐probit model of discrete differences between required and necessary qualifications that depend on firm, job, and worker attributes. Estimates support the model's predictions, providing a continuous, predicted signal measure for second‐stage earnings equations. These results provide the first formal evidence of a significant, positive, gender‐specific return to a signal and indicate a downward bias in the return to education from excluding the signal measure.</description><subject>Coefficients</subject><subject>Earnings</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Education</subject><subject>Educational attainment</subject><subject>Employee qualifications</subject><subject>Employees</subject><subject>Employers</subject><subject>Human capital</subject><subject>Human resources</subject><subject>Hypotheses</subject><subject>Labour economics</subject><subject>Mathematical models</subject><subject>Men</subject><subject>Modeling</subject><subject>Monitoring costs</subject><subject>Outcomes of education</subject><subject>Overqualification</subject><subject>Productivity</subject><subject>Qualifications</subject><subject>Signalling</subject><subject>Skilled workers</subject><subject>Wages</subject><subject>Wages & salaries</subject><subject>Workers</subject><issn>0030-7653</issn><issn>1464-3812</issn><issn>1464-3812</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2003</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpdkM1LAzEUxIMoWKs3jx4WBU9um-TlZZNjqdoKxQ9QEC8h3WbbrdtmTbZg_3u3VDx4evDmN8MwhJwz2mNUQ9-7uo_Y4z2m2QHpMCFFCorxQ9KhFGiaSYRjchLjklIqKGYdcjVIGhebxBdJs3BJLOdrW1Xlep4strVvX7GMp-SosFV0Z7-3S97u716H43TyNHoYDiZpLhhvUjYtaD4DmGk1lVYJiQ6tU1ohFkLOGIdM5Dky5M5xWQDlSiiwFsFKRJDQJdf73Dr4r03byqzKmLuqsmvnN9GAEoCKsha8_Acu_Sa0xaNhWismgWUtdLOH8uBjDK4wdShXNmwNo2Y3l2nnMoiGt6Zd5sUeX8bGhz8WhFJK01ZO93IZG_f9J9vwaWQGGZrx-4d5zoDdjl60eYQfA5FzOw</recordid><startdate>20030401</startdate><enddate>20030401</enddate><creator>Chatterji, Monojit</creator><creator>Seaman, Paul T.</creator><creator>Singell Jr, Larry D.</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><general>Oxford Publishing Limited (England)</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20030401</creationdate><title>A test of the signalling hypothesis</title><author>Chatterji, Monojit ; Seaman, Paul T. ; Singell Jr, Larry D.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c412t-1bf0cd33d98b6a8465e5ae89855f46d12374cc5152ee26f3028483aa53a655363</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2003</creationdate><topic>Coefficients</topic><topic>Earnings</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Education</topic><topic>Educational attainment</topic><topic>Employee qualifications</topic><topic>Employees</topic><topic>Employers</topic><topic>Human capital</topic><topic>Human resources</topic><topic>Hypotheses</topic><topic>Labour economics</topic><topic>Mathematical models</topic><topic>Men</topic><topic>Modeling</topic><topic>Monitoring costs</topic><topic>Outcomes of education</topic><topic>Overqualification</topic><topic>Productivity</topic><topic>Qualifications</topic><topic>Signalling</topic><topic>Skilled workers</topic><topic>Wages</topic><topic>Wages & salaries</topic><topic>Workers</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Chatterji, Monojit</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Seaman, Paul T.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Singell Jr, Larry D.</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Oxford economic papers</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Chatterji, Monojit</au><au>Seaman, Paul T.</au><au>Singell Jr, Larry D.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A test of the signalling hypothesis</atitle><jtitle>Oxford economic papers</jtitle><addtitle>Oxf. Econ. Pap</addtitle><date>2003-04-01</date><risdate>2003</risdate><volume>55</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>191</spage><epage>215</epage><pages>191-215</pages><issn>0030-7653</issn><issn>1464-3812</issn><eissn>1464-3812</eissn><coden>OXEPA8</coden><abstract>Education may enhance earnings either because of human capital increases or by signalling unobservable worker attributes. Previous tests of these alternatives relied on ad hoc distinctions between them. Our theoretical model provides a direct signal measure as the difference between required and necessary qualifications, forming the basis for an ordered‐probit model of discrete differences between required and necessary qualifications that depend on firm, job, and worker attributes. Estimates support the model's predictions, providing a continuous, predicted signal measure for second‐stage earnings equations. These results provide the first formal evidence of a significant, positive, gender‐specific return to a signal and indicate a downward bias in the return to education from excluding the signal measure.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/oep/55.2.191</doi><tpages>25</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0030-7653 |
| ispartof | Oxford economic papers, 2003-04, Vol.55 (2), p.191-215 |
| issn | 0030-7653 1464-3812 1464-3812 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38435801 |
| source | Oxford journals; JSTOR |
| subjects | Coefficients Earnings Economic models Economic theory Economics Education Educational attainment Employee qualifications Employees Employers Human capital Human resources Hypotheses Labour economics Mathematical models Men Modeling Monitoring costs Outcomes of education Overqualification Productivity Qualifications Signalling Skilled workers Wages Wages & salaries Workers |
| title | A test of the signalling hypothesis |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-12T03%3A02%3A33IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A%20test%20of%20the%20signalling%20hypothesis&rft.jtitle=Oxford%20economic%20papers&rft.au=Chatterji,%20Monojit&rft.date=2003-04-01&rft.volume=55&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=191&rft.epage=215&rft.pages=191-215&rft.issn=0030-7653&rft.eissn=1464-3812&rft.coden=OXEPA8&rft_id=info:doi/10.1093/oep/55.2.191&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E3488890%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=199816317&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=3488890&rfr_iscdi=true |