Noncooperative Counter-threats to Vote Trading

It is demonstrated that whenever the first issue of a vote trade involves pivotal vote switching, vote trades can never be advantageous only for a minority if the members of the majority act individually to attain optimal benefits. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, a disorganized majority may b...

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Veröffentlicht in:	American journal of political science 1979-02, Vol.23 (1), p.121-138
1. Verfasser:	Enelow, James M.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Electoral behaviour Logical givens Majority rule Minority voters Optimal policy Optimal strategies Ordered pairs Trade Voting Voting behavior
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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