Know-how sharing with stochastic innovations
We provide a model of know-how sharing between competing firms in which each of two firms gets a stochastic innovation in its stock of know-how in every period. Separately considering the cases when innovations are indivisible and divisible, we examine the nature of the subgame perfect sharing agree...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Canadian journal of economics 2001-05, Vol.34 (2), p.525-548 |
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| container_end_page | 548 |
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| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 525 |
| container_title | The Canadian journal of economics |
| container_volume | 34 |
| creator | Eaton, B. Curtis Eswaran, Mukesh |
| description | We provide a model of know-how sharing between competing firms in which each of two firms gets a stochastic innovation in its stock of know-how in every period. Separately considering the cases when innovations are indivisible and divisible, we examine the nature of the subgame perfect sharing agreements that can obtain. We discover that both stochasticity and indivisibility undermine the ability to support sharing. Furthermore, we find that there are equilibria in which know-how sharing can be intermittent and that small innovations are more likely to be shared than large ones, when innovations are divisible but not necessarily when they are indivisible. JEL Classification: O30, O33 |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/0008-4085.00087 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | The Canadian journal of economics, 2001-05, Vol.34 (2), p.525-548 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Canada Cheating Competition Cooperation Economics Economic models Economic theory Enterprises Information sharing Innovation Innovations Knowledge Nash equilibrium Profit Ritual exchange Sharing Steel industry Stochastic models Stochastic processes Studies Technological innovation Temptation Trade |
| title | Know-how sharing with stochastic innovations |
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