Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory

This paper examines an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve on the unique no-gifts equilibrium by two different types of gift exchange: simple and complex exchange, respectively. Complex exchange gives higher payoffs than simple exchange, but it requires not only mutual t...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic inquiry 2001-04, Vol.39 (2), p.280-297
Hauptverfasser:	DER HEIJDEN, ELINE C.M. VAN, NELISSEN, JAN H. M, POTTERS, JAN J. M, VERBON, HARRIE A. A
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Analysis Ceremonial exchange Cooperation Economic research Economics Equilibrium Exchange Game theory Gifts Hypotheses Institutions Investment Mathematical models Pay-off Reciprocity Reciprocity theorems Studies Trust
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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