Comment on ‘Market discipline and monetary policy’ by Carl Walsh
This paper shows that the results Walsh (2000, Market discipline and monetary policy, Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 249–71) obtains are highly sensitive to the assumption that different wage contracts are based on different information sets even though they are negotiated simultaneously. In particular...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Oxford economic papers 2005-10, Vol.57 (4), p.732-739 |
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| container_end_page | 739 |
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| container_title | Oxford economic papers |
| container_volume | 57 |
| creator | Bugarin, Mauricio S. de Carvalho, Fabia A. |
| description | This paper shows that the results Walsh (2000, Market discipline and monetary policy, Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 249–71) obtains are highly sensitive to the assumption that different wage contracts are based on different information sets even though they are negotiated simultaneously. In particular, the power of future expectations to discipline an opportunistic central banker is much weaker when homogeneous information sets are used. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/oep/gpi033 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Oxford economic papers, 2005-10, Vol.57 (4), p.732-739 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| subjects | Asymmetric information Central banking Central banks Contract negotiations Contracts Economic expectations Economic growth Economic models Economic recessions Game theory Inflation Inflation rates Monetary models Monetary policy Output gaps Rational expectations Recessions Studies Wage contracts |
| title | Comment on ‘Market discipline and monetary policy’ by Carl Walsh |
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