CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when t...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of finance (New York) 2005-12, Vol.60 (6), p.2661-2700
Hauptverfasser:	MALMENDIER, ULRIKE, TATE, GEOFFREY
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Business investment Business structures Capital investments Cash flow Chief executive officers Corporate finance Corporate governance Corporate investments Decision making Error Executives Financial economics Financial investments Financial management Financial performance Financial policy Impact analysis Investment policy Management attitudes Quantitative analysis Stock options Stock ownership Stock prices Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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