Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective
While reformers have argued that multiple directorships for executives can destroy value, we investigate firms with executives that accept an outside directorship and find negative announcement returns only when the executive's firm has greater agency problems. When fewer agency concerns exist,...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of finance (New York) 2005-08, Vol.60 (4), p.2083-2123 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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