Capital tax competition and returns to scale
That some capital importing regions subsidize units of capital is inconsistent with the standard models of the capital tax competition literature. We maintain the assumption of capital homogeneity and relax the assumption of constant returns to scale. Among other things, we show that symmetric regio...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Regional science and urban economics 2005-07, Vol.35 (4), p.353-373 |
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| container_title | Regional science and urban economics |
| container_volume | 35 |
| creator | Burbidge, John Cuff, Katherine |
| description | That some capital importing regions subsidize units of capital is inconsistent with the standard models of the capital tax competition literature. We maintain the assumption of capital homogeneity and relax the assumption of constant returns to scale. Among other things, we show that symmetric regions in a Nash equilibrium may subsidize capital as may a capital importing region in an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. We also prove that any inefficiencies in asymmetric Nash equilibria with both capital and head taxes arise entirely from regions' incentives to manipulate the terms of trade, and not from increasing returns. We also show that the existence of increasing returns can reverse the result that small regions have higher per capita utility in Nash equilibria with only capital taxes. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2004.05.003 |
| format | Article |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0166-0462 |
| ispartof | Regional science and urban economics, 2005-07, Vol.35 (4), p.353-373 |
| issn | 0166-0462 1879-2308 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38161928 |
| source | RePEc; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Capital Capital tax Capital tax competition Competing regions Competitive advantage Economic models Economic theory Increasing returns Mathematical methods Nash equilibrium Rates of return Regional economics Regional studies Returns to scale Studies Tax competition Taxation |
| title | Capital tax competition and returns to scale |
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