VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO
Under the rules of the WTO, governments are prohibited from negotiating voluntary export restraints (VERs) but may negotiate price undertakings (i.e. import price minima). While these two policies can have identical effects in models of perfect competition, they can have very different economic cons...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Review of international economics 2005-05, Vol.13 (2), p.298-310 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 310 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 298 |
| container_title | Review of international economics |
| container_volume | 13 |
| creator | Moore, Michael O. |
| description | Under the rules of the WTO, governments are prohibited from negotiating voluntary export restraints (VERs) but may negotiate price undertakings (i.e. import price minima). While these two policies can have identical effects in models of perfect competition, they can have very different economic consequences with imperfect competition. The model presented here shows that in a model of international Bertrand duopoly, a VER can result in lower domestic prices and profits than a price minimum regime. This suggests that price undertakings should also be prohibited under the WTO. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00505.x |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38157209</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>868743811</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4225-6f7d1ee701ef195a0a937a748c03c008057755df4b803416dbd7190dafcd27ba3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNkE1PwzAMhiMEEmPwHyoOSBw6nKZpmgMHQGMfmtg0sXG0sjaFjq4bSQfbvyelaAdORPJHYj-O9RLiUehQd26WHRpGwpdMRp0AgHecOb87Iq1D4Zi0QEbcF1xEp-TM2iUA5bGEFrmed6fWU2XqTUyeaG9WptpU6j0vX623rS9e9aa9l-fxOTnJVGH1xW9sk9lj9_mh74_GvcHD3chPwiDgfpSJlGotgOqMSq5ASSaUCOMEWAIQAxeC8zQLFzGwkEbpIhVUQqqyJA3EQrE2uWrmbsz6Y6tthavcJrooVKnXW4ssplwEIF3j5Z_G5XprSrcbBkHAOGXOt0ncNCVmba3RGW5MvlJmjxSwFhCXWOuEtU5YC4g_AuLOocMGNXqjkwO3KJTRn7l7-USmKHNu7-wHZSqvU2ebOsoYmfvmrVq5YbfNsK-80Pt_L4HT8aDrMsf7DZ_bSu8OvDLvGAkmOL489bD_OJzc9-cRcvYN3SGb4A</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>222351322</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO</title><source>RePEc</source><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>Access via Wiley Online Library</source><creator>Moore, Michael O.</creator><creatorcontrib>Moore, Michael O.</creatorcontrib><description>Under the rules of the WTO, governments are prohibited from negotiating voluntary export restraints (VERs) but may negotiate price undertakings (i.e. import price minima). While these two policies can have identical effects in models of perfect competition, they can have very different economic consequences with imperfect competition. The model presented here shows that in a model of international Bertrand duopoly, a VER can result in lower domestic prices and profits than a price minimum regime. This suggests that price undertakings should also be prohibited under the WTO.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0965-7576</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1467-9396</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00505.x</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><subject>Duopoly ; Economic impact ; Economic models ; Exports ; Globalization ; Imperfect competition ; Imports ; International economics ; International trade ; Manycountries ; Market theory ; Mathematical methods ; Pricing ; Studies ; Trade agreements ; Trade barriers ; World Trade Organization</subject><ispartof>Review of international economics, 2005-05, Vol.13 (2), p.298-310</ispartof><rights>Copyright Blackwell Publishing May 2005</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4225-6f7d1ee701ef195a0a937a748c03c008057755df4b803416dbd7190dafcd27ba3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4225-6f7d1ee701ef195a0a937a748c03c008057755df4b803416dbd7190dafcd27ba3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9396.2005.00505.x$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9396.2005.00505.x$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,1417,4008,27924,27925,45574,45575</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/blareviec/v_3a13_3ay_3a2005_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a298-310.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Moore, Michael O.</creatorcontrib><title>VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO</title><title>Review of international economics</title><description>Under the rules of the WTO, governments are prohibited from negotiating voluntary export restraints (VERs) but may negotiate price undertakings (i.e. import price minima). While these two policies can have identical effects in models of perfect competition, they can have very different economic consequences with imperfect competition. The model presented here shows that in a model of international Bertrand duopoly, a VER can result in lower domestic prices and profits than a price minimum regime. This suggests that price undertakings should also be prohibited under the WTO.</description><subject>Duopoly</subject><subject>Economic impact</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Exports</subject><subject>Globalization</subject><subject>Imperfect competition</subject><subject>Imports</subject><subject>International economics</subject><subject>International trade</subject><subject>Manycountries</subject><subject>Market theory</subject><subject>Mathematical methods</subject><subject>Pricing</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Trade agreements</subject><subject>Trade barriers</subject><subject>World Trade Organization</subject><issn>0965-7576</issn><issn>1467-9396</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2005</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkE1PwzAMhiMEEmPwHyoOSBw6nKZpmgMHQGMfmtg0sXG0sjaFjq4bSQfbvyelaAdORPJHYj-O9RLiUehQd26WHRpGwpdMRp0AgHecOb87Iq1D4Zi0QEbcF1xEp-TM2iUA5bGEFrmed6fWU2XqTUyeaG9WptpU6j0vX623rS9e9aa9l-fxOTnJVGH1xW9sk9lj9_mh74_GvcHD3chPwiDgfpSJlGotgOqMSq5ASSaUCOMEWAIQAxeC8zQLFzGwkEbpIhVUQqqyJA3EQrE2uWrmbsz6Y6tthavcJrooVKnXW4ssplwEIF3j5Z_G5XprSrcbBkHAOGXOt0ncNCVmba3RGW5MvlJmjxSwFhCXWOuEtU5YC4g_AuLOocMGNXqjkwO3KJTRn7l7-USmKHNu7-wHZSqvU2ebOsoYmfvmrVq5YbfNsK-80Pt_L4HT8aDrMsf7DZ_bSu8OvDLvGAkmOL489bD_OJzc9-cRcvYN3SGb4A</recordid><startdate>200505</startdate><enddate>200505</enddate><creator>Moore, Michael O.</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><general>Wiley Blackwell</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200505</creationdate><title>VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO</title><author>Moore, Michael O.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4225-6f7d1ee701ef195a0a937a748c03c008057755df4b803416dbd7190dafcd27ba3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2005</creationdate><topic>Duopoly</topic><topic>Economic impact</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Exports</topic><topic>Globalization</topic><topic>Imperfect competition</topic><topic>Imports</topic><topic>International economics</topic><topic>International trade</topic><topic>Manycountries</topic><topic>Market theory</topic><topic>Mathematical methods</topic><topic>Pricing</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Trade agreements</topic><topic>Trade barriers</topic><topic>World Trade Organization</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Moore, Michael O.</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Review of international economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Moore, Michael O.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO</atitle><jtitle>Review of international economics</jtitle><date>2005-05</date><risdate>2005</risdate><volume>13</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>298</spage><epage>310</epage><pages>298-310</pages><issn>0965-7576</issn><eissn>1467-9396</eissn><abstract>Under the rules of the WTO, governments are prohibited from negotiating voluntary export restraints (VERs) but may negotiate price undertakings (i.e. import price minima). While these two policies can have identical effects in models of perfect competition, they can have very different economic consequences with imperfect competition. The model presented here shows that in a model of international Bertrand duopoly, a VER can result in lower domestic prices and profits than a price minimum regime. This suggests that price undertakings should also be prohibited under the WTO.</abstract><cop>Oxford, UK</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00505.x</doi><tpages>13</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0965-7576 |
| ispartof | Review of international economics, 2005-05, Vol.13 (2), p.298-310 |
| issn | 0965-7576 1467-9396 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38157209 |
| source | RePEc; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Access via Wiley Online Library |
| subjects | Duopoly Economic impact Economic models Exports Globalization Imperfect competition Imports International economics International trade Manycountries Market theory Mathematical methods Pricing Studies Trade agreements Trade barriers World Trade Organization |
| title | VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-21T09%3A36%3A23IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=VERs%20and%20Price%20Undertakings%20under%20the%20WTO&rft.jtitle=Review%20of%20international%20economics&rft.au=Moore,%20Michael%20O.&rft.date=2005-05&rft.volume=13&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=298&rft.epage=310&rft.pages=298-310&rft.issn=0965-7576&rft.eissn=1467-9396&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00505.x&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E868743811%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=222351322&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |