Regulatory Impressionism: What Regulators Can and Cannot Do

Regulatory Impressionism: What Regulators Can and Cannot Do

The decision-making process in state utility commissions is best described as "regulatory impressionism." Working in concert with longstanding notions of judicial deference, the existence of regulatory impressionism has far-reaching implications for the move towards a competitive marketpla...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The review of network economics 2003-12, Vol.2 (4), p.466-479
1. Verfasser: Gifford, Raymond L.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Decision making
Economic reform
Public services
Regulation
Regulatory policy
U.S.A
Utilities
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 479
container_issue 4
container_start_page 466
container_title The review of network economics
container_volume 2
creator Gifford, Raymond L.
description The decision-making process in state utility commissions is best described as "regulatory impressionism." Working in concert with longstanding notions of judicial deference, the existence of regulatory impressionism has far-reaching implications for the move towards a competitive marketplace in the digital age. This article explores how state commissions should operate given a plethora of constraints from both internal and external sources, concluding that the most effective reforms must come from within.
doi_str_mv 10.2202/1446-9022.1039
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38103440</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>38103440</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-b2964-7d37a5a26772aec92bf2d6945d6674efbc0ed41abaf0b221b5c0ee4d3c088cda3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp1kL1PwzAQxS0EEqWwMmdiS3FsJ45hQgVKEeJLRXSzLrFTUpK42Img_z2OgroxvdO7-93pHkKnEZ4Qgsl5xFgSCkzIJMJU7KHRzthHIxIJFsZC0EN05NwaY8IxT0fo8lWvugpaY7fBvN5Y7VxpmtLVF8H7B7TBru2CKTQBNKrXxrTBtTlGBwVUTp_86Ri93d4spnfhw9NsPr16CDMiEhZyRTnEQBLOCehckKwgKhEsVknCmS6yHGvFIsigwBkhURZ7QzNFc5ymuQI6RmfD3o01X512raxLl-uqgkabzkma-ocZw35wMgzm1jhndSE3tqzBbmWEZZ-R7CORfSSyz8gD6QB8Q9Vqq_TKdltfyLXpbON_-gckzKPhgJau1T-7Q2A_ZcIpj-XLgsnl4yx-XuJ7uaS_kPR6Nw</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>38103440</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Regulatory Impressionism: What Regulators Can and Cannot Do</title><source>Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals</source><source>De Gruyter journals</source><creator>Gifford, Raymond L.</creator><creatorcontrib>Gifford, Raymond L.</creatorcontrib><description>The decision-making process in state utility commissions is best described as "regulatory impressionism." Working in concert with longstanding notions of judicial deference, the existence of regulatory impressionism has far-reaching implications for the move towards a competitive marketplace in the digital age. This article explores how state commissions should operate given a plethora of constraints from both internal and external sources, concluding that the most effective reforms must come from within.</description><identifier>ISSN: 2194-5993</identifier><identifier>ISSN: 1446-9022</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1446-9022</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1039</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>De Gruyter</publisher><subject>Decision making ; Economic reform ; Public services ; Regulation ; Regulatory policy ; U.S.A ; Utilities</subject><ispartof>The review of network economics, 2003-12, Vol.2 (4), p.466-479</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-b2964-7d37a5a26772aec92bf2d6945d6674efbc0ed41abaf0b221b5c0ee4d3c088cda3</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.2202/1446-9022.1039/pdf$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwalterdegruyter$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.2202/1446-9022.1039/html$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwalterdegruyter$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,27901,27902,66725,68509</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Gifford, Raymond L.</creatorcontrib><title>Regulatory Impressionism: What Regulators Can and Cannot Do</title><title>The review of network economics</title><description>The decision-making process in state utility commissions is best described as "regulatory impressionism." Working in concert with longstanding notions of judicial deference, the existence of regulatory impressionism has far-reaching implications for the move towards a competitive marketplace in the digital age. This article explores how state commissions should operate given a plethora of constraints from both internal and external sources, concluding that the most effective reforms must come from within.</description><subject>Decision making</subject><subject>Economic reform</subject><subject>Public services</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>Regulatory policy</subject><subject>U.S.A</subject><subject>Utilities</subject><issn>2194-5993</issn><issn>1446-9022</issn><issn>1446-9022</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2003</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp1kL1PwzAQxS0EEqWwMmdiS3FsJ45hQgVKEeJLRXSzLrFTUpK42Img_z2OgroxvdO7-93pHkKnEZ4Qgsl5xFgSCkzIJMJU7KHRzthHIxIJFsZC0EN05NwaY8IxT0fo8lWvugpaY7fBvN5Y7VxpmtLVF8H7B7TBru2CKTQBNKrXxrTBtTlGBwVUTp_86Ri93d4spnfhw9NsPr16CDMiEhZyRTnEQBLOCehckKwgKhEsVknCmS6yHGvFIsigwBkhURZ7QzNFc5ymuQI6RmfD3o01X512raxLl-uqgkabzkma-ocZw35wMgzm1jhndSE3tqzBbmWEZZ-R7CORfSSyz8gD6QB8Q9Vqq_TKdltfyLXpbON_-gckzKPhgJau1T-7Q2A_ZcIpj-XLgsnl4yx-XuJ7uaS_kPR6Nw</recordid><startdate>20031201</startdate><enddate>20031201</enddate><creator>Gifford, Raymond L.</creator><general>De Gruyter</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20031201</creationdate><title>Regulatory Impressionism: What Regulators Can and Cannot Do</title><author>Gifford, Raymond L.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-b2964-7d37a5a26772aec92bf2d6945d6674efbc0ed41abaf0b221b5c0ee4d3c088cda3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2003</creationdate><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Economic reform</topic><topic>Public services</topic><topic>Regulation</topic><topic>Regulatory policy</topic><topic>U.S.A</topic><topic>Utilities</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Gifford, Raymond L.</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The review of network economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Gifford, Raymond L.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Regulatory Impressionism: What Regulators Can and Cannot Do</atitle><jtitle>The review of network economics</jtitle><date>2003-12-01</date><risdate>2003</risdate><volume>2</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>466</spage><epage>479</epage><pages>466-479</pages><issn>2194-5993</issn><issn>1446-9022</issn><eissn>1446-9022</eissn><abstract>The decision-making process in state utility commissions is best described as "regulatory impressionism." Working in concert with longstanding notions of judicial deference, the existence of regulatory impressionism has far-reaching implications for the move towards a competitive marketplace in the digital age. This article explores how state commissions should operate given a plethora of constraints from both internal and external sources, concluding that the most effective reforms must come from within.</abstract><pub>De Gruyter</pub><doi>10.2202/1446-9022.1039</doi><tpages>14</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 2194-5993
ispartof The review of network economics, 2003-12, Vol.2 (4), p.466-479
issn 2194-5993
1446-9022
1446-9022
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_38103440
source Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals; De Gruyter journals
subjects Decision making
Economic reform
Public services
Regulation
Regulatory policy
U.S.A
Utilities
title Regulatory Impressionism: What Regulators Can and Cannot Do
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-19T00%3A36%3A03IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Regulatory%20Impressionism:%20What%20Regulators%20Can%20and%20Cannot%20Do&rft.jtitle=The%20review%20of%20network%20economics&rft.au=Gifford,%20Raymond%20L.&rft.date=2003-12-01&rft.volume=2&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=466&rft.epage=479&rft.pages=466-479&rft.issn=2194-5993&rft.eissn=1446-9022&rft_id=info:doi/10.2202/1446-9022.1039&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E38103440%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=38103440&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true