Honest certification and the threat of capture

This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: (1) Honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price. (2) Hones...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	International journal of industrial organization 2005-02, Vol.23 (1), p.45-62
1. Verfasser:	Strausz, Roland
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bribery Certification Collusion Corruption Efficient markets Enterprises Industrial economics Industrial organization Monopolies Natural monopoly Prices Reputation Reputations Specialization Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!