Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets
We investigate the optimal behavior of a public firm in a mixed market involving private firms and one public firm. Existing works show that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is suboptimal when the number of firms is given exogenously. We allow free entry of private firms and find that,...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) Austria), 2005-02, Vol.84 (1), p.27-48 |
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| container_end_page | 48 |
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| container_issue | 1 |
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| container_title | Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria) |
| container_volume | 84 |
| creator | Matsumura, Toshihiro Kanda, Osamu |
| description | We investigate the optimal behavior of a public firm in a mixed market involving private firms and one public firm. Existing works show that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is suboptimal when the number of firms is given exogenously. We allow free entry of private firms and find that, in contrast to the case with the fixed number of firms, welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Furthermore, we find that mixed markets are better than pure markets involving no public firm if and only if the public firm earns nonnegative profits. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00712-004-0098-z |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria), 2005-02, Vol.84 (1), p.27-48 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Average cost Banking Business structures Cost functions Cost of entry Economic theory Economics Enterprises Financial performance Free entry Marginal costs Market Market entry Monopolistic competition Oligopolies Oligopoly Private sector Privatization Profit Public enterprise Public sector Publicly traded corporations Restriction Restrictions Studies Welfare losses |
| title | Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets |
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