Access charges and quality choice in competing networks

We study the impact of reciprocal access charges on the incentives to invest in networks of higher quality. We show how private and social preferences always diverge once investments are endogenized. Private negotiations never lead to charges being set at their marginal cost. Whether or not marginal...

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Veröffentlicht in:Information economics and policy 2004-09, Vol.16 (3), p.391-409
Hauptverfasser: Cambini, Carlo, Valletti, Tommaso M.
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container_title Information economics and policy
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creator Cambini, Carlo
Valletti, Tommaso M.
description We study the impact of reciprocal access charges on the incentives to invest in networks of higher quality. We show how private and social preferences always diverge once investments are endogenized. Private negotiations never lead to charges being set at their marginal cost. Whether or not marginal cost charges have good dynamic properties depends on the way investments in quality impact on traffic generated on the networks.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.007
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identifier ISSN: 0167-6245
ispartof Information economics and policy, 2004-09, Vol.16 (3), p.391-409
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language eng
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source RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete; PAIS Index
subjects Access charges
Competition
Interconnection
Investment
Investments
Networks
Policy studies
Pricing policies
Quality
Quality standards
Telecommunications
Telecommunications industry
title Access charges and quality choice in competing networks
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