Tariffs and the most favored nation clause
In an n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade ( n≥3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Under the non-cooperative tariff equilibrium, each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially har...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of international economics 2004-07, Vol.63 (2), p.341-368 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 368 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 341 |
| container_title | Journal of international economics |
| container_volume | 63 |
| creator | Saggi, Kamal |
| description | In an
n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (
n≥3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Under the non-cooperative tariff equilibrium, each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption by each country improves world welfare by eliminating this trade diversion. Under linear demand, MFN adoption by the country with the average production cost is most desirable. High cost countries refuse
reciprocal MFN adoption with other countries and also lose even if
others engage in reciprocal MFN adoption amongst themselves. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00057-6 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37965340</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S0022199603000576</els_id><sourcerecordid>672912571</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c686t-2bd1fe93123530943bbe5c0925c502b4191ee9c127ab4b0f0b4acf87771968973</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFkM1LxDAQxYMouH78CULxICpUJ0mbNCcR8RPBg3oe0nSKkd1mTboL_vdmXfHgxcPL5PB7b4bH2AGHMw5cnT8DCFFyY9QxyBMAqHWpNtiEN1qWIGu5ySa_yDbbSek9Q7qR1YSdvtjo-z4VduiK8Y2KWUhj0dtliNQVgx19GAo3tYtEe2yrt9NE-z9zl73eXL9c3ZWPT7f3V5ePpVONGkvRdrwnI7nIm8FUsm2pdmBE7WoQbcUNJzKOC23bqoUe2sq6vtFac6Mao-UuO1rnzmP4WFAaceaTo-nUDhQWCaU2qpYVZPDwD_geFnHIt6EQNddcgspQvYZcDClF6nEe_czGT-SAq_rwuz5cdYMg8bs-XPke1r5Ic3K_JiLyA7kw4BKlVTI_n1kCoMrDr75Z8yxZcZSqwbdxlsMu1mGUe1t6ipicp8FR5yO5Ebvg_znnCxTMjUI</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>225171306</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Tariffs and the most favored nation clause</title><source>RePEc</source><source>ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present)</source><creator>Saggi, Kamal</creator><creatorcontrib>Saggi, Kamal</creatorcontrib><description>In an
n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (
n≥3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Under the non-cooperative tariff equilibrium, each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption by each country improves world welfare by eliminating this trade diversion. Under linear demand, MFN adoption by the country with the average production cost is most desirable. High cost countries refuse
reciprocal MFN adoption with other countries and also lose even if
others engage in reciprocal MFN adoption amongst themselves.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-1996</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-0353</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00057-6</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JIECBE</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Economic models ; Globalization ; Industry ; International economics ; Intraindustry trade ; Most favored nation clause ; Oligopoly ; Studies ; Tariffs ; Trade policy</subject><ispartof>Journal of international economics, 2004-07, Vol.63 (2), p.341-368</ispartof><rights>2003 Elsevier B.V.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Jul 2004</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c686t-2bd1fe93123530943bbe5c0925c502b4191ee9c127ab4b0f0b4acf87771968973</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c686t-2bd1fe93123530943bbe5c0925c502b4191ee9c127ab4b0f0b4acf87771968973</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00057-6$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3550,4008,27924,27925,45995</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeeinecon/v_3a63_3ay_3a2004_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a341-368.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Saggi, Kamal</creatorcontrib><title>Tariffs and the most favored nation clause</title><title>Journal of international economics</title><description>In an
n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (
n≥3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Under the non-cooperative tariff equilibrium, each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption by each country improves world welfare by eliminating this trade diversion. Under linear demand, MFN adoption by the country with the average production cost is most desirable. High cost countries refuse
reciprocal MFN adoption with other countries and also lose even if
others engage in reciprocal MFN adoption amongst themselves.</description><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Globalization</subject><subject>Industry</subject><subject>International economics</subject><subject>Intraindustry trade</subject><subject>Most favored nation clause</subject><subject>Oligopoly</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Tariffs</subject><subject>Trade policy</subject><issn>0022-1996</issn><issn>1873-0353</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2004</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkM1LxDAQxYMouH78CULxICpUJ0mbNCcR8RPBg3oe0nSKkd1mTboL_vdmXfHgxcPL5PB7b4bH2AGHMw5cnT8DCFFyY9QxyBMAqHWpNtiEN1qWIGu5ySa_yDbbSek9Q7qR1YSdvtjo-z4VduiK8Y2KWUhj0dtliNQVgx19GAo3tYtEe2yrt9NE-z9zl73eXL9c3ZWPT7f3V5ePpVONGkvRdrwnI7nIm8FUsm2pdmBE7WoQbcUNJzKOC23bqoUe2sq6vtFac6Mao-UuO1rnzmP4WFAaceaTo-nUDhQWCaU2qpYVZPDwD_geFnHIt6EQNddcgspQvYZcDClF6nEe_czGT-SAq_rwuz5cdYMg8bs-XPke1r5Ic3K_JiLyA7kw4BKlVTI_n1kCoMrDr75Z8yxZcZSqwbdxlsMu1mGUe1t6ipicp8FR5yO5Ebvg_znnCxTMjUI</recordid><startdate>20040701</startdate><enddate>20040701</enddate><creator>Saggi, Kamal</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>Elsevier Sequoia S.A</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20040701</creationdate><title>Tariffs and the most favored nation clause</title><author>Saggi, Kamal</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c686t-2bd1fe93123530943bbe5c0925c502b4191ee9c127ab4b0f0b4acf87771968973</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2004</creationdate><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Globalization</topic><topic>Industry</topic><topic>International economics</topic><topic>Intraindustry trade</topic><topic>Most favored nation clause</topic><topic>Oligopoly</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Tariffs</topic><topic>Trade policy</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Saggi, Kamal</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of international economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Saggi, Kamal</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Tariffs and the most favored nation clause</atitle><jtitle>Journal of international economics</jtitle><date>2004-07-01</date><risdate>2004</risdate><volume>63</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>341</spage><epage>368</epage><pages>341-368</pages><issn>0022-1996</issn><eissn>1873-0353</eissn><coden>JIECBE</coden><abstract>In an
n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (
n≥3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Under the non-cooperative tariff equilibrium, each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption by each country improves world welfare by eliminating this trade diversion. Under linear demand, MFN adoption by the country with the average production cost is most desirable. High cost countries refuse
reciprocal MFN adoption with other countries and also lose even if
others engage in reciprocal MFN adoption amongst themselves.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00057-6</doi><tpages>28</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0022-1996 |
| ispartof | Journal of international economics, 2004-07, Vol.63 (2), p.341-368 |
| issn | 0022-1996 1873-0353 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37965340 |
| source | RePEc; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Economic models Globalization Industry International economics Intraindustry trade Most favored nation clause Oligopoly Studies Tariffs Trade policy |
| title | Tariffs and the most favored nation clause |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-06T06%3A51%3A46IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Tariffs%20and%20the%20most%20favored%20nation%20clause&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20international%20economics&rft.au=Saggi,%20Kamal&rft.date=2004-07-01&rft.volume=63&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=341&rft.epage=368&rft.pages=341-368&rft.issn=0022-1996&rft.eissn=1873-0353&rft.coden=JIECBE&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00057-6&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E672912571%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=225171306&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S0022199603000576&rfr_iscdi=true |