Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State‐Owned Enterprises

This article examines the extent to which agency theory may explain chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in Chinese state‐owned enterprises during the 1980s. We find support for the agency theory: CEO pay sensitivity decreases with the variance of performance. Moreover, the performance sensiti...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of labor economics 2004-07, Vol.22 (3), p.615-637
Hauptverfasser:	Mengistae, Taye, Colin Xu, Lixin
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Academic achievement Agency theory Business risks Case studies Chief executive officers Chinese Compensation Corporations Economic theory Empirical evidence Enterprises Executive compensation Hypotheses Incentive pay Incentives Labor economics Labor market Labour economics Labour relations Marginal productivity Marginal profit Musical agency Performance evaluation Planning Productivity Profitability Profits Public enterprise Reforms Regulated industries Retention State State budgets Studies U.S.A
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