Fair Division with No Information
We consider a situation in which a central authority must allocate non-tradeable and non-marketable goods between a group of individuals in a fair way. There are exogenous divisibility constraints imposed on the goods to be allocated. The authority has absolutely no information on the preferences of...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Economic theory 2004-08, Vol.24 (2), p.351-371 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 371 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 351 |
| container_title | Economic theory |
| container_volume | 24 |
| creator | Leroux, Alain Leroux, Justin |
| description | We consider a situation in which a central authority must allocate non-tradeable and non-marketable goods between a group of individuals in a fair way. There are exogenous divisibility constraints imposed on the goods to be allocated. The authority has absolutely no information on the preferences of the recipients; moreover, no interaction is allowed among recipients or between the authority and the recipients. Envy-freeness is the equity criterion adopted. Using a remarkable property of simplices (which we introduce and prove) we argue that assigning bundles of equal expected value (forming what is called in this paper the class of "balanced allocations") is hardly fair unless extra effort is made to discriminate between these proposed allocations. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00199-003-0440-x |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37947448</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>25055819</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>25055819</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c385t-837ba396ae763b0236a95e5279f3114afae17152a8321a8d8598a5db619f04bd3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpdkE1LAzEQhoMoWKs_wIOwevC2OpOPTXKUarVQ9KLnkN1mMaXd1GSr9d-bsuLB0_AOzzsMDyHnCDcIIG8TAGpdArASOIdyd0BGyBnNSepDMgLNVEmp0MfkJKUlAAhRqRG5nFofi3v_6ZMPXfHl-_fiORSzrg1xbfu8OyVHrV0ld_Y7x-Rt-vA6eSrnL4-zyd28bJgSfamYrC3TlXWyYjVQVlktnKBStwyR29Y6lCioVYyiVQsltLJiUVeoW-D1go3J9XB3E8PH1qXerH1q3GplOxe2yTCpueRcZfDqH7gM29jl3wylHIWWkmYIB6iJIaXoWrOJfm3jt0Ewe2NmMGayMbM3Zna5czF0lqkP8a9ARXalULMfL4hlZg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>224159772</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Fair Division with No Information</title><source>SpringerNature Journals</source><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><creator>Leroux, Alain ; Leroux, Justin</creator><creatorcontrib>Leroux, Alain ; Leroux, Justin</creatorcontrib><description>We consider a situation in which a central authority must allocate non-tradeable and non-marketable goods between a group of individuals in a fair way. There are exogenous divisibility constraints imposed on the goods to be allocated. The authority has absolutely no information on the preferences of the recipients; moreover, no interaction is allowed among recipients or between the authority and the recipients. Envy-freeness is the equity criterion adopted. Using a remarkable property of simplices (which we introduce and prove) we argue that assigning bundles of equal expected value (forming what is called in this paper the class of "balanced allocations") is hardly fair unless extra effort is made to discriminate between these proposed allocations.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0938-2259</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1432-0479</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0440-x</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag</publisher><subject>Arbitration ; Distribution ; Division ; Economic models ; Economic theory ; Equality ; Expected utility ; Expected values ; Hyperplanes ; Information economics ; Marginal utility ; Market ; Mathematical theorems ; Mathematical vectors ; Procedural justice ; Studies ; Value ; Vertices</subject><ispartof>Economic theory, 2004-08, Vol.24 (2), p.351-371</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg</rights><rights>Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c385t-837ba396ae763b0236a95e5279f3114afae17152a8321a8d8598a5db619f04bd3</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25055819$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/25055819$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,27924,27925,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Leroux, Alain</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Leroux, Justin</creatorcontrib><title>Fair Division with No Information</title><title>Economic theory</title><description>We consider a situation in which a central authority must allocate non-tradeable and non-marketable goods between a group of individuals in a fair way. There are exogenous divisibility constraints imposed on the goods to be allocated. The authority has absolutely no information on the preferences of the recipients; moreover, no interaction is allowed among recipients or between the authority and the recipients. Envy-freeness is the equity criterion adopted. Using a remarkable property of simplices (which we introduce and prove) we argue that assigning bundles of equal expected value (forming what is called in this paper the class of "balanced allocations") is hardly fair unless extra effort is made to discriminate between these proposed allocations.</description><subject>Arbitration</subject><subject>Distribution</subject><subject>Division</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Equality</subject><subject>Expected utility</subject><subject>Expected values</subject><subject>Hyperplanes</subject><subject>Information economics</subject><subject>Marginal utility</subject><subject>Market</subject><subject>Mathematical theorems</subject><subject>Mathematical vectors</subject><subject>Procedural justice</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Value</subject><subject>Vertices</subject><issn>0938-2259</issn><issn>1432-0479</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2004</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNpdkE1LAzEQhoMoWKs_wIOwevC2OpOPTXKUarVQ9KLnkN1mMaXd1GSr9d-bsuLB0_AOzzsMDyHnCDcIIG8TAGpdArASOIdyd0BGyBnNSepDMgLNVEmp0MfkJKUlAAhRqRG5nFofi3v_6ZMPXfHl-_fiORSzrg1xbfu8OyVHrV0ld_Y7x-Rt-vA6eSrnL4-zyd28bJgSfamYrC3TlXWyYjVQVlktnKBStwyR29Y6lCioVYyiVQsltLJiUVeoW-D1go3J9XB3E8PH1qXerH1q3GplOxe2yTCpueRcZfDqH7gM29jl3wylHIWWkmYIB6iJIaXoWrOJfm3jt0Ewe2NmMGayMbM3Zna5czF0lqkP8a9ARXalULMfL4hlZg</recordid><startdate>20040801</startdate><enddate>20040801</enddate><creator>Leroux, Alain</creator><creator>Leroux, Justin</creator><general>Springer-Verlag</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20040801</creationdate><title>Fair Division with No Information</title><author>Leroux, Alain ; Leroux, Justin</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c385t-837ba396ae763b0236a95e5279f3114afae17152a8321a8d8598a5db619f04bd3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2004</creationdate><topic>Arbitration</topic><topic>Distribution</topic><topic>Division</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Equality</topic><topic>Expected utility</topic><topic>Expected values</topic><topic>Hyperplanes</topic><topic>Information economics</topic><topic>Marginal utility</topic><topic>Market</topic><topic>Mathematical theorems</topic><topic>Mathematical vectors</topic><topic>Procedural justice</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Value</topic><topic>Vertices</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Leroux, Alain</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Leroux, Justin</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Global News & ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Access via ABI/INFORM (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Economic theory</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Leroux, Alain</au><au>Leroux, Justin</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Fair Division with No Information</atitle><jtitle>Economic theory</jtitle><date>2004-08-01</date><risdate>2004</risdate><volume>24</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>351</spage><epage>371</epage><pages>351-371</pages><issn>0938-2259</issn><eissn>1432-0479</eissn><abstract>We consider a situation in which a central authority must allocate non-tradeable and non-marketable goods between a group of individuals in a fair way. There are exogenous divisibility constraints imposed on the goods to be allocated. The authority has absolutely no information on the preferences of the recipients; moreover, no interaction is allowed among recipients or between the authority and the recipients. Envy-freeness is the equity criterion adopted. Using a remarkable property of simplices (which we introduce and prove) we argue that assigning bundles of equal expected value (forming what is called in this paper the class of "balanced allocations") is hardly fair unless extra effort is made to discriminate between these proposed allocations.</abstract><cop>Heidelberg</cop><pub>Springer-Verlag</pub><doi>10.1007/s00199-003-0440-x</doi><tpages>21</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0938-2259 |
| ispartof | Economic theory, 2004-08, Vol.24 (2), p.351-371 |
| issn | 0938-2259 1432-0479 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37947448 |
| source | SpringerNature Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Arbitration Distribution Division Economic models Economic theory Equality Expected utility Expected values Hyperplanes Information economics Marginal utility Market Mathematical theorems Mathematical vectors Procedural justice Studies Value Vertices |
| title | Fair Division with No Information |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-24T13%3A25%3A55IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Fair%20Division%20with%20No%20Information&rft.jtitle=Economic%20theory&rft.au=Leroux,%20Alain&rft.date=2004-08-01&rft.volume=24&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=351&rft.epage=371&rft.pages=351-371&rft.issn=0938-2259&rft.eissn=1432-0479&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/s00199-003-0440-x&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E25055819%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=224159772&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=25055819&rfr_iscdi=true |