Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes

This article develops a theory of multiunit auctions where short squeezes can occur in the secondary market. Both uniform and discriminatory auctions are studied and bidders can submit multiple bids. We show that bidders with short and long preauction positions have different valuations in an otherw...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Review of financial studies 2004-07, Vol.17 (2), p.545-580
Hauptverfasser:	Nyborg, Kjell G., Strebulaev, Ilya A.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Auction markets Auctions Bidding Central banks Economic theory Finance Free rider effect Free riding Market equilibrium Market power Revenue Secondary markets Stock exchange Studies Valuation
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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