Bilateral Bargaining, Unverifiable Quality, and Options to Return

The paper investigates an alternating-offers bargaining game between a buyer and a seller who face several trading opportunities. These items (goods or services) differ in their non-verifiable quality characteristics which gives rise to a moral hazard problem on the seller's part. For the speci...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic theory 2004-02, Vol.23 (2), p.395-410
Hauptverfasser:	Kessler, Anke S., Lülfesmann, Christoph
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Athletic drafts & trades Bargaining Bilateral relations Commodities Contracts Customers Economic theory Economics Efficient markets Equilibrium Game theory Games Goods Moral hazard Nash equilibrium Product returns Sales Trade Trade agreements Uniqueness Warranties
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