Is Three a Crowd? Competition among Regulators in Banking

Banks are able to switch among three options for a primary federal regulator: the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the OCC. We examine why they switch and what the results of switches are. We find support for the hypothesis that competition among regulators has beneficial aspects. Regulators seem to s...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of money, credit and banking credit and banking, 2003-12, Vol.35 (6), p.967-998
1. Verfasser:	Rosen, Richard J.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Administrative agencies Analysis Antitrust Bank assets Bank compliance Bank examinations Bank examiners Bank loans Bank portfolios Banking industry Banking law Banking regulation Banking system Charters Commercial banks Commercial regulation Competition Comptrollers Construction loans Economic theory Environmental policy Federal Reserve Bank Federalism Finance Forecasts and trends Independent regulatory commissions Insurance regulation Investment risk Market trend/market analysis Membership Regulation Regulation of financial institutions Regulatory agencies Securities regulations Services Stockholders Studies U.S.A
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