Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games

Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games

Majority auction games are simultaneous sealed-bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction (more than a half) of the objects. Each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning m...

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Veröffentlicht in:Games and economic behavior 2003-11, Vol.45 (2), p.278-295
Hauptverfasser: Szentes, Balázs, Rosenthal, Robert W.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Auctions
Economics
Equilibrium
Exposure problem
Game theory
Games
Human behaviour
Microeconomics
Mixed strategy
Simultaneous auction
Strategic planning
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Rosenthal, Robert W.
description Majority auction games are simultaneous sealed-bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction (more than a half) of the objects. Each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it. Symmetric equilibria having simple, intuitive forms are shown to exist in first-price, second-price and all-pay versions of such games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large. This contrasts with earlier results for the two-bidder “pure chopstick” majority auction games where the only known equilibria are more complicated.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00131-3
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source RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete
subjects Auctions
Economics
Equilibrium
Exposure problem
Game theory
Games
Human behaviour
Microeconomics
Mixed strategy
Simultaneous auction
Strategic planning
title Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games
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