Causal deviance and the attribution of moral responsibility
Are current theories of moral responsibility missing a factor in the attribution of blame and praise? Four studies demonstrated that even when cause, intention, and outcome (factors generally assumed to be sufficient for the ascription of moral responsibility) are all present, blame and praise are d...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of experimental social psychology 2003-11, Vol.39 (6), p.653-660 |
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| container_end_page | 660 |
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| container_issue | 6 |
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| container_title | Journal of experimental social psychology |
| container_volume | 39 |
| creator | Pizarro, David A. Uhlmann, Eric Bloom, Paul |
| description | Are current theories of moral responsibility missing a factor in the attribution of blame and praise? Four studies demonstrated that even when cause, intention, and outcome (factors generally assumed to be sufficient for the ascription of moral responsibility) are all present, blame and praise are discounted when the factors are not linked together in the usual manner (i.e., cases of “causal deviance”). Experiment 4 further demonstrates that this effect of causal deviance is driven by intuitive gut feelings of right and wrong, not logical deliberation. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00041-6 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of experimental social psychology, 2003-11, Vol.39 (6), p.653-660 |
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| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Behavior Behavioural sciences Experimental psychology Morality Morals Psychology Responsibility Social behaviour Social psychology Theory |
| title | Causal deviance and the attribution of moral responsibility |
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