Constitutional foundations of economic freedom: a time-series cross-section analysis

Using time-series cross-section analysis, we provide additional empirical validation for the principal-agent model developed by Adserà et al. (2003). In our innovation, efficient economic policy is proxied by 'economic freedom' from the Fraser Institute database and constitutional 'po...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Constitutional political economy 2005-12, Vol.10 (4), p.327-346
Hauptverfasser:	Vanssay, Xavier de, Hildebrand, Vincent, Spindler, Zane A
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Constitution Freedom Governance Political economy Political institutions Principal-agent theory
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description	Using time-series cross-section analysis, we provide additional empirical validation for the principal-agent model developed by Adserà et al. (2003). In our innovation, efficient economic policy is proxied by 'economic freedom' from the Fraser Institute database and constitutional 'political institutions' are proxied by variables from the Database of Political Institutions. Our results suggest that the more credible the threat of removal from office, the more government officials will pursue efficient economic policies. Reprinted by permission of Springer
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subjects	Constitution Freedom Governance Political economy Political institutions Principal-agent theory
title	Constitutional foundations of economic freedom: a time-series cross-section analysis
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