Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keepi...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Econometrica 2006-07, Vol.74 (4), p.1109-1132
Hauptverfasser:	Bikhchandani, Sushil, Chatterji, Shurojit, Lavi, Ron, Mu'alem, Ahuva, Nisan, Noam, Sen, Arunava
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency theory Applications Auctions Determinism Dominant strategy Dominant-strategy implementation Economic theory Exact sciences and technology Games of strategy Insurance, economics, finance Marginal utility Mathematical economics Mathematical functions Mathematical monotonicity Mathematics Mechanism design Microeconomics multi-object auctions Notes and Comments Probability and statistics Public choice Sciences and techniques of general use Social choice Statistics Studies Sufficient conditions Utility functions
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!