Functional Change and Bank Strategy in German Corporate Governance
This paper analyses changes in the German corporate governance system in the 1990s, using a functional perspective that separates the functions of governance from the institutions that perform these functions. Financial globalization, harmonized legislation within the European Union, and domestic pr...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | International review of law and economics 2006-07, Vol.25 (4), p.513-540 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 540 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 4 |
| container_start_page | 513 |
| container_title | International review of law and economics |
| container_volume | 25 |
| creator | Crane, Dwight B. Schaede, Ulrike |
| description | This paper analyses changes in the German corporate governance system in the 1990s, using a functional perspective that separates the functions of governance from the institutions that perform these functions. Financial globalization, harmonized legislation within the European Union, and domestic pressures have triggered a move away from the postwar German system of bank-based governance, and towards more market-oriented processes. The paper shows that these forces have resulted in heightening transparency, more active capital markets, and a greatly reduced role of banks in the governance process. However, Germany's 2002 boycott of EU takeover legislation has created a void in the current governance system: because bank intervention and the market for corporate control are substitutes, a reduced role of a banks and protective takeover legislation mean that one important governance function is currently underserved. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.irle.2005.12.001 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37766788</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S0144818805000475</els_id><sourcerecordid>1153552311</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c487t-27b762fa018975fd1650a6217d97d2035d8463c2b032a117ceca016e116041f53</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kEFv3CAQhVHVSN0m_QM9WT30ZocBDKyUS7JKtoki5ZDkjAgeJ2y94IJ3pf33wdqqhx5yGECj994MHyHfgTZAQZ5vGp8GbBilbQOsoRQ-kQVoxWvJl-IzWVAQotag9RfyNecNpVRKJRfk6mYX3ORjsEO1erPhFSsbuurKht_V45TshK-HyodqjWlrQ7WKaYxzt1rHPaZgg8MzctLbIeO3v_cpeb65flr9qu8f1rery_vaCa2mmqkXJVlvKeilavsOZEutZKC6peoY5W2nheSOvVDOLIBy6IpWIoCkAvqWn5Kfx9wxxT87zJPZ-uxwGGzAuMuGK1X-pHUR_vhPuIm7suuQTRknmAKYRewocinmnLA3Y_Jbmw4GqJmZmo2ZmZqZqQFmCtNiujuaEo7o_jkQsUht6ewNt6wtx2F-zE5ufSlRaizVAjetoOZt2pawi2MYFmh7j8lk57EA7XxCN5ku-o92eQdQopZA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>217427118</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Functional Change and Bank Strategy in German Corporate Governance</title><source>RePEc</source><source>Access via ScienceDirect (Elsevier)</source><creator>Crane, Dwight B. ; Schaede, Ulrike</creator><creatorcontrib>Crane, Dwight B. ; Schaede, Ulrike</creatorcontrib><description>This paper analyses changes in the German corporate governance system in the 1990s, using a functional perspective that separates the functions of governance from the institutions that perform these functions. Financial globalization, harmonized legislation within the European Union, and domestic pressures have triggered a move away from the postwar German system of bank-based governance, and towards more market-oriented processes. The paper shows that these forces have resulted in heightening transparency, more active capital markets, and a greatly reduced role of banks in the governance process. However, Germany's 2002 boycott of EU takeover legislation has created a void in the current governance system: because bank intervention and the market for corporate control are substitutes, a reduced role of a banks and protective takeover legislation mean that one important governance function is currently underserved.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0144-8188</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-6394</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2005.12.001</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Acquisitions & mergers ; Analysis ; Banks ; Corporate governance ; Corporate governance reform ; European Union ; Functional analysis ; Functional perspective ; Germany ; Germany, EU takeover code harmonization ; Harmonization ; Legislation ; Reform ; Take-overs</subject><ispartof>International review of law and economics, 2006-07, Vol.25 (4), p.513-540</ispartof><rights>2005 Elsevier Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. Dec 2005</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c487t-27b762fa018975fd1650a6217d97d2035d8463c2b032a117ceca016e116041f53</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c487t-27b762fa018975fd1650a6217d97d2035d8463c2b032a117ceca016e116041f53</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2005.12.001$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3550,4008,27924,27925,45995</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeeirlaec/v_3a25_3ay_3a2005_3ai_3a4_3ap_3a513-540.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Crane, Dwight B.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schaede, Ulrike</creatorcontrib><title>Functional Change and Bank Strategy in German Corporate Governance</title><title>International review of law and economics</title><description>This paper analyses changes in the German corporate governance system in the 1990s, using a functional perspective that separates the functions of governance from the institutions that perform these functions. Financial globalization, harmonized legislation within the European Union, and domestic pressures have triggered a move away from the postwar German system of bank-based governance, and towards more market-oriented processes. The paper shows that these forces have resulted in heightening transparency, more active capital markets, and a greatly reduced role of banks in the governance process. However, Germany's 2002 boycott of EU takeover legislation has created a void in the current governance system: because bank intervention and the market for corporate control are substitutes, a reduced role of a banks and protective takeover legislation mean that one important governance function is currently underserved.</description><subject>Acquisitions & mergers</subject><subject>Analysis</subject><subject>Banks</subject><subject>Corporate governance</subject><subject>Corporate governance reform</subject><subject>European Union</subject><subject>Functional analysis</subject><subject>Functional perspective</subject><subject>Germany</subject><subject>Germany, EU takeover code harmonization</subject><subject>Harmonization</subject><subject>Legislation</subject><subject>Reform</subject><subject>Take-overs</subject><issn>0144-8188</issn><issn>1873-6394</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2006</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kEFv3CAQhVHVSN0m_QM9WT30ZocBDKyUS7JKtoki5ZDkjAgeJ2y94IJ3pf33wdqqhx5yGECj994MHyHfgTZAQZ5vGp8GbBilbQOsoRQ-kQVoxWvJl-IzWVAQotag9RfyNecNpVRKJRfk6mYX3ORjsEO1erPhFSsbuurKht_V45TshK-HyodqjWlrQ7WKaYxzt1rHPaZgg8MzctLbIeO3v_cpeb65flr9qu8f1rery_vaCa2mmqkXJVlvKeilavsOZEutZKC6peoY5W2nheSOvVDOLIBy6IpWIoCkAvqWn5Kfx9wxxT87zJPZ-uxwGGzAuMuGK1X-pHUR_vhPuIm7suuQTRknmAKYRewocinmnLA3Y_Jbmw4GqJmZmo2ZmZqZqQFmCtNiujuaEo7o_jkQsUht6ewNt6wtx2F-zE5ufSlRaizVAjetoOZt2pawi2MYFmh7j8lk57EA7XxCN5ku-o92eQdQopZA</recordid><startdate>20060701</startdate><enddate>20060701</enddate><creator>Crane, Dwight B.</creator><creator>Schaede, Ulrike</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>Elsevier Science Ltd</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20060701</creationdate><title>Functional Change and Bank Strategy in German Corporate Governance</title><author>Crane, Dwight B. ; Schaede, Ulrike</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c487t-27b762fa018975fd1650a6217d97d2035d8463c2b032a117ceca016e116041f53</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2006</creationdate><topic>Acquisitions & mergers</topic><topic>Analysis</topic><topic>Banks</topic><topic>Corporate governance</topic><topic>Corporate governance reform</topic><topic>European Union</topic><topic>Functional analysis</topic><topic>Functional perspective</topic><topic>Germany</topic><topic>Germany, EU takeover code harmonization</topic><topic>Harmonization</topic><topic>Legislation</topic><topic>Reform</topic><topic>Take-overs</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Crane, Dwight B.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schaede, Ulrike</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>International review of law and economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Crane, Dwight B.</au><au>Schaede, Ulrike</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Functional Change and Bank Strategy in German Corporate Governance</atitle><jtitle>International review of law and economics</jtitle><date>2006-07-01</date><risdate>2006</risdate><volume>25</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>513</spage><epage>540</epage><pages>513-540</pages><issn>0144-8188</issn><eissn>1873-6394</eissn><abstract>This paper analyses changes in the German corporate governance system in the 1990s, using a functional perspective that separates the functions of governance from the institutions that perform these functions. Financial globalization, harmonized legislation within the European Union, and domestic pressures have triggered a move away from the postwar German system of bank-based governance, and towards more market-oriented processes. The paper shows that these forces have resulted in heightening transparency, more active capital markets, and a greatly reduced role of banks in the governance process. However, Germany's 2002 boycott of EU takeover legislation has created a void in the current governance system: because bank intervention and the market for corporate control are substitutes, a reduced role of a banks and protective takeover legislation mean that one important governance function is currently underserved.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1016/j.irle.2005.12.001</doi><tpages>28</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0144-8188 |
| ispartof | International review of law and economics, 2006-07, Vol.25 (4), p.513-540 |
| issn | 0144-8188 1873-6394 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_37766788 |
| source | RePEc; Access via ScienceDirect (Elsevier) |
| subjects | Acquisitions & mergers Analysis Banks Corporate governance Corporate governance reform European Union Functional analysis Functional perspective Germany Germany, EU takeover code harmonization Harmonization Legislation Reform Take-overs |
| title | Functional Change and Bank Strategy in German Corporate Governance |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-23T04%3A22%3A14IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Functional%20Change%20and%20Bank%20Strategy%20in%20German%20Corporate%20Governance&rft.jtitle=International%20review%20of%20law%20and%20economics&rft.au=Crane,%20Dwight%20B.&rft.date=2006-07-01&rft.volume=25&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=513&rft.epage=540&rft.pages=513-540&rft.issn=0144-8188&rft.eissn=1873-6394&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.irle.2005.12.001&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E1153552311%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=217427118&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S0144818805000475&rfr_iscdi=true |