On Efficiency of Decentralized Environmental Regulation
Contrary to conventional wisdom about an environmental race to the bottom, the theoretical literature as exemplified by Oates and Schwab [1988, Journal of Public Economics, 35:333-354] maintains that homogeneous jurisdictions' decentralized choices are likely to be socially optimal because each...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of regulatory economics 2005-09, Vol.28 (2), p.129-140 |
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| container_end_page | 140 |
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| container_title | Journal of regulatory economics |
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| creator | Kunce, Mitch Shogren, Jason F |
| description | Contrary to conventional wisdom about an environmental race to the bottom, the theoretical literature as exemplified by Oates and Schwab [1988, Journal of Public Economics, 35:333-354] maintains that homogeneous jurisdictions' decentralized choices are likely to be socially optimal because each locale sets capital tax rates to zero and sets optimal environmental standards. This paper shows the well-received Oates-Schwab-style efficiency result is not likely if allowed aggregate-emissions act as a firm-augmenting public input that benefits mobile firms. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11149-005-3105-9 |
| format | Article |
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This paper shows the well-received Oates-Schwab-style efficiency result is not likely if allowed aggregate-emissions act as a firm-augmenting public input that benefits mobile firms. 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| ispartof | Journal of regulatory economics, 2005-09, Vol.28 (2), p.129-140 |
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| language | eng |
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| subjects | Competition Decentralization Economic models Economic theory Efficiency Emission standards Emissions control Environmental policy Environmental regulations Federalism Fiscal policy Jurisdiction Local government Market entry Pollution Public good Regulatory policy Standardization Studies Tax rates Taxes |
| title | On Efficiency of Decentralized Environmental Regulation |
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